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"You May Have Already Won . . .- ":
Telemarketing Fraud and the Need
for a Federal Legislative Solution
"There's a sucker born every minute."
-P.T. Barnum
I. INTRODUCTION
Teresa M. Angle, a inety-year-old widow, lived in a one bedroom
apartment in Rochester, New York.' She had been married three times
and had survived all three husbands. Mrs. Angle's third husband had
invested their money wisely in blue-chip stocks and had left Mrs. Angle
financially secure and comfortable.'
On June 1, 1989, Jim Coburn telephoned Mrs. Angle and identified
himself as an investment broker for a company called Group America.'
Mr. Coburn told Mrs. Angle about the excellent investment potential of
foreign currencies, especially the Japanese yen. Mrs. Angle, who had
travelled extensively and had visited the Far East, was intrigued by Mr.
Coburn's sales presentation and his promises of financial security. She
told Mr. Coburn she would "think it over."4
The following week, Mr. Coburn telephoned Mrs. Angle again and told
her that she should take advantage of the investment opportunity imme-
diately because the yen was "doing good."' These discussions persuaded
Mrs. Angle and she forwarded a check to Group America for $5,152.80. A
week later, Mrs. Angle sent Group America an additional $6,097.01.'
1. The Nature and Extent of Telemarketing Fraud and Federal and State Law
Enforcement Efforts to Combat It: Hearings Before the Commerce, Consumer and
Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990) [hereinafter The Nature and Extent of Telemarketing
Fraud].
2. Id. at 16-18.
3. Id. at 17.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
Over the next nine months, Mr. Coburn and other representatives of
Group America called Mrs. Angle and convinced her to convert all of her
assets to the investments they suggested. On Group America's recom-
mendations, she invested in the yen, British pound notes, Deutche marks,
platinum, copper, gold, and other currencies and metals.7 She paid for
her investments either by check or by directly sending her stock certifi-
cates, which Group America sold and converted to currencies and met-
als.8
Mrs. Angle's purchases ranged in amount from $5,000 to well over
$100,000 per order. Although salesmen from Group America told Mrs.
Angle that "the sky was the limit" and promised her profits up to
$1,000,000 on her investments, Mrs. Angle lost nearly every dollar she
"invested" through Group America." Mrs. Angle testified before a con-
gressional subcommittee that, acting on Group America's investment
advice, she had lost over $800,000, including the loss of dividend earn-
ings she would have realized if she had not sold her stock." During her
relationship with Group America, her considerable assets plummeted to
about $40,000.2 She testified that her financial ruin had caused her
many sleepless nights and constant anxiety over the state of her finances
and the likelihood that she could not afford the rent on her apartment.
She said:
I cannot really explain why I let these total strangers sweet talk and badger me
into sending my life savings to them, except to say that they must have taken
advantage of my loneliness by constantly calling me on the telephone and talking
to me and my need for financial security which they promised they could achieve
for me by these 'hot investments."'
Unfortunately, Mrs. Angle's experience is not uncommon. Over the
past decade, telemarketing has expanded into an industry worth over
$400 billion per year. " Unscrupulous swindlers, seeing the telephone as
a useful tool to conduct their deceit, have taken advantage of the
telemarketing industry to bilk consumers out of billions of dollars annu-
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id. Mrs. Angle owned stock in such companies as Eastman Kodak, Chase Man-
hattan, and General Motors. She also had money in several mutual funds. All of these
assets were converted to the investments suggested by Group America. Mrs. Angle
did not know how much Group America sold her stocks for. Id. at 17-18.
9. Id. at 16-18.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 24.
12. Id. at 16.
13. Id. at 16-17.
14. Nadji Tehrani, Publisher's Outlook: We Agree With the U.S. Department of
Commerce ... HR 1304, as Proposed, Is Too Restrictive on Business and Unneces-
sary!, TELEMARKETING, Sept. 1991, at 1 (reporting that in 1991, telemarketing account-
ed for $435 billion in sales).
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ally. 5 Fraudulent telemarketers win the confidence of consumers
through' slick sales presentations and prey upon their weaknesses. The
number and complexity of fraudulent telemarketing scams have contin-
ued to increase and have touched literally every geographical region of
the country and every segment of society."
This Comment will examine the nature and extent of telemarketing
fraud and attempts by local, state, and the federal government to combat
it. Section II will detail the operation of a typical telemarketing business,
the types of scams most often used by fraudulent telemarketers, and the
groups most often victimized by telemarketing fraud. 7 Section III will
address various approaches by state and local government agencies to
eliminate fraudulent telemarketing, and the difficulties these efforts have
faced. 8 Section IV will examine federal legislation currently pending in
Congress designed to give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) authori-
ty to make rules regulating the telemarketing industry and state attorneys
general the power to prosecute fraudulent telemarketers in federal
court." Finally, Section V will focus on the federal bills and offers sug-
gestions for FTC rules, further legislation, and other programs.'
II. TELEMARKETING FRAUD: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
The telephone, virtually since its invention, has exhibited its potential
as a powerful business machine.2' Although the phone has been used for
15. Telemarketing Fraud: Hearing on S 2213, H.R. 4101, and S. 2326 Before the
Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 2213, H.R.
4101, and S. 2326]. Senator Albert Gore stated:
Some have suggested that telemarketing fraud ought to go by the slogan
"Reach out and cheat someone," for that is exactly what is now happening.
There is no mistaking it, telemarketing fraud is a billion dollar a year illicit
industry that most often involves . . . offers that are simply too good to be
true.
Id.
16. Denise Gellene, FBI Launches 12-State Telemarketing Sweep; Fraud: Authori-
ties Arrest Dozens and Impound Property Worth More Than $1 Million in a Nation-
wide Crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at DI (estimating that 9 out of 10 Ameri-
cans had been targets of "suspicious solicitations").
17. See supra notes 21-172 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 173-290 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 291-334 and accompanying text.
20. See supra notes 335-99 and accompanying text.
21. MURRAY ROMAN, TELEPHONE MARKETING TECHNIQUES 7 (1979). Roman, a noted
over one hundred years in all facets of the business world, the wide-
spread use of the phone as a marketing tool and a vehicle for initial
customer contact is a fairly recent development.' Businesses have be-
gun to understand the potential uses for telemarketing' and, with the
advances in telecommunications technology, are beginning to tap that
potential.24
The applications of telemarketing are continually increasing in both
number and complexity. Organizations use telemarketing to raise funds
for charity,' to make service calls to pre-existing customers," to follow
up with direct mail solicitations,27 to remind magazine subscribers to re-
telemarketing expert, states that the phone "was used as a business adjunct long
before it became the socially oriented instrument it is now considered." Id. He points
out that a list produced by the Bell Telephone Company in 1878 named 272 different
businesses with phones. Id.
22. Felix M. Kent, Regulation of Telemarketing, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1988, at 3. Al-
though "telephones have been used to market products . . . since the invention of
the telephone," sophisticated and widespread telemarketing has emerged only over the
past two decades. Id. In fact, "[slome economic forecasters [predict] . . . that, except
for perishables and certain other items, a large part of the American family's shop-
ping budget [in the 21st Century] will be expended for purchases made from the
home." Id. This growth in the telemarketing industry has been traced, to both techno-
logical advances, such as computers and credit cards, and sociological changes, such
as the growth of the two income family and the resultant decrease in time available
for families to shop. Id.
23. "Telemarketing" is defined as "a new marketing discipline that uses telecom-
munications technology as part of a well-planned, organized, and managed marketing
program that prominently features the use of personal selling, using non-face-to-face
contacts." BOB STONE & JOHN WYMAN, SUCCESSFUL TELEMARKETING: OPPORTUNITIES AND
TECHNIQUES FOR INCREASING SALES AND PROFTrS 210 (2d ed. 1992).
24. Tehrani, supra note 14, at 88. Telemarketing has become, "by far, the most
effective tool in sales, customer service, credit collection, market research and busi-
ness negotiation, which are the lifeblood of every business, small or large." Id.
25. STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at 114-15. The Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystro-
phy Telethon is the best known example of fundraising through telemarketing. How-
ever, telemarketing is also used by many other charities and organizations. It has
been estimated that over $40 billion per year is raised for charitable organizations,
with a large percentage of that money raised through phone solicitations. Id.
26. EDWARD L. NASH, DIRECT MARKETING: STRATEGY, PLANNING, EXECUTION 158 (2d
ed. 1986). Companies can contact existing customers to advise them that an order
has been delayed or that an item is out of stock in a certain color or size. Id. An-
other example of the use of telemarketing with existing customers is the "GE Answer
Center." General Electric operates a large telemarketing center that consumers can
call toll-free for information on the operation and maintenance of GE products. STONE
& WYMAN, supra note 23, at 214.
27. NASH, supra note 26, at 159. Telemarketers may send out promotional materials
to consumers with a number to call. One example is a promotion run by Johnnie
Walker Scotch. Consumers were given an opportunity to win $25,000 by calling a toll-
free 800 number. The recorded message asked the caller to answer a simple question:
name the city where Johnnie Walker is bottled. Of course, the answer was available
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new," to prospect for future customers,' and to conduct market re-
search and political polling.' In addition, businesses use telemarketing
for a wide array of tasks. Many small businesses use telemarketing as a
cost-effective way to advertise and develop new clients?
on the label from any bottle of Johnnie Walker. STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at
82.
28. NASH, supra note 26, at. 159 (after a series of letters reminding a subscriber to
renew, the publisher may call the subscriber directly).
29. Id. at 160. "Cold calling" can be expensive, but it can also be an effective way
to develop, future clients. Generally a less experienced salesperson will make calls at-
tempting to "bird dog," or set up appointments with, potential clients. When the nov-
ice salesperson identifies a solid lead, he turns it over to a more experienced solici-
tor who attempts to make the sale. Id.
30. Id. at 157 ("The most aggressive users of [telemarketing] have been politicians,
whose paid and volunteer workers canvass voters, raise funds, and get supporters to
the polls on election day.").
31. Ann M. Arcadi, Note, What About the Lucky Leprechaun?: An Argument
Against "The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991," 1991 CoLuM. Bus. L REV.
417, 427. The owners of the Lucky Leprechaun, a chimney-sweep service in Salem,
Oregon, discovered telemarketing and found that it gave them "10 or 15 solid leads"
for new customers each day at a much lower price than the advertisements they
used to run. The Lucky Leprechaun used an "automatic dialer announcing device"
(ADAD), a computer that automatically dials random telephone numbers and plays a
pre-recorded advertisement. Id.
Many states have banned the use of ADADs or have enacted statutes requiring
that a live operator make initial contact with the recipient of the call and ask per-
mission to play the pre-recorded message. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 2874(a) (West Supp. 1993). However, these laws defeat the purpose of ADADs.
Small businesses use the machines to save money on advertising because the require-
ment of live operators drives up the cost of advertising. The Oregon Supreme Court
unanimously overturned an Oregon state law prohibiting ADADs, holding that the law
is a violation of free-speech rights guaranteed by the Oregon Constitution. Charles E.
Beggs, Oregon Top Court Cuts Off Phone-Solicitor Law, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 20,
1993, at B6. However, the United States Supreme Court recently upheld the states'
right to restrict the use of ADADs. In April 1993, the Supreme Court refused, without
comment, to hear a challenge to Minnesota's ADAD law. Paula M. Alberta, High
Court Backs Rights of States to Restrict Automatic Dialing, DM NEWS, Apr. 5, 1993,
at 1.
The Federal government, following the lead of state ADAD statutes, and reacting
to public outcry that denounced ADADs as an invasion of privacy, passed the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (Supp.
1991), which bans. the use of ADADs for commercial purposes. The owners of the
Lucky Leprechaun filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the federal law,
and, in December 1992, an Oregon district court judge granted the motion, finding
that the Lucky Leprechaun had raised a serious constitutional question as to the
validity of the TCPA under the First and Fifth Amendments. Moser v. FCC, 811 F.
The use of the phone for marketing purposes is advantageous to busi-
nesses for several reasons. First, telemarketing is highly selective, reach-
ing only the individuals the telemarketer chooses to solicit.' Second,
telemarketing "reaches out to its customer with ultimate immediacy;" it
puts the seller and customer in direct personal contact.' Third, the di-
rect contact between the potential buyer and seller forces the potential
buyer to respond in some way, thus giving the seller immediate feedback
regarding the product and the sales technique. In fact, "most people feel
an obligation to be courteous. Few people just hang up."'
Most telemarketing firms, whether legitimate or fraudulent, are set up
in a similar manner and employ many of the same methods. The follow-
ing section will detail the organization of a typical telemarketing opera-
tion. The operation described is a legally run business designed to locate
potential customers and make sales over the phone; the use of this basic
organizational framework in illegally run telemarketing operations will be
discussed in later sections.
A. A Typical Telemarketing Operation
1. The "Front End"
The first and most important task every telemarketing operation must
perform is to locate potential customers. Telemarketers seek to develop
potential customers or "leads" who have attributes very similar to exist-
ing customers or fit into the specific target group for the particular prod-
uct.' Telemarketers acquire names and addresses of prospects from a
Supp. 541 (D. Or. 1992). Subsequently, Moser was granted summary judgment by the
court, which held that the TCPA placed unconstitutional restrictions on protected
commercial speech. Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993).
Although ADAD telemarketing comprises a significant portion of telemarketing
activity, a detailed analysis of the use of such machines is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
32. NASH, supra note 26, at 157.
33. Id. at 157-58.
34. Id. at 158. The author also recognizes that the immediacy and direct contact
between potential buyer and seller can have negative aspects: "Nothing will irritate a
consumer quite as much as a poorly timed, poorly conceived, or poorly executed
telephone call." Id.
35. STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at 108-10. An analysis of a company's current
client list can indicate the precise demographic group or specific attributes upon
which the company should concentrate. ROMAN, supra note 21, at 17.
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number of different sources including phone books, magazine subscriber
lists, list brokers,' and club rosters.37
Once the telemarketer has compiled a contact list, front-end salespeo-
ple, or "fronters," make the initial contact with the customers either by
placing calls to the potential customers, known as an "outbound pro-
gram,"38 or by receiving calls from customers who respond to advertise-
ments placed by the telemarketer, known as an "inbound program."'
Fronters, the least experienced salespeople in any telemarketing opera-
tion, work out of large phone rooms, sometimes pejoratively called "boil-
er rooms,"4° containing many salespeople and many phones.4 ' The front
end, in both outbound and inbound programs, is the most expensive and
time-consuming component of any telemarketing operation.42
36. A list broker compiles client lists from various sources, such as credit card
companies, and then sells them to telemarketers and other direct marketers. NASH,
supra note 26, at 80-83.
37. ROMAN, supra note 21, at 17.
38. In an outbound program, the telemarketer makes calls, attempting to locate
customers interested in buying its products. STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at 3,
208. Outbound programs are more expensive to run because, since the telemarketer
is making the initial contact, the consumer may be contacted at an inconvenient time
and, thus, is unreceptive to a sales presentation. Id. at 155-57.
39. In an inbound program, the telemarketer induces the customer to call the com-
pany either by mailing out promotional pamphlets or by print, radio, or television
advertising. Id. at 164. Inbound programs usually generate more sales than outbound
programs because the customer, by calling in, has already demonstrated an interest in
the product or service and calls at his convenience. Id.
40. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING
FRAUD: WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT?, H.R. REP. No. 421, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 n.3
(1991) [hereinafter THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD]:
The term boiler room comes from the past when telemarketers would rent
space for a short time in old buildings, often in the basement near or in the
boiler rooms . . . . Boiler rooms [today] can be set up anywhere but usually
involve a short lease, a quick set up, a large room . .. with many salesmen
and telephones, and then a quick departure when the scam is detected.
Id. This Comment will differentiate between illegal boiler room operators and legitimate
telemarketers. The term "boiler room" will only be used to denote illegal telemarketing
operations.
41. Id. See also Richard L. Bencin & Donald J. Jonovic, Anatomy of a Boiler
Room, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEMARKETING 517 (Richard L. Bencin. & Donald J.
Jonovic eds. 1989) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEMARKETING] (describing the "run-
down, sub-human, inadequate facilities" inside a boiler room).
42. TIlE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 17. Although front
end sales are low, the back end is so profitable that a telemarketer can profit greatly
even if only 4 out of 150 people contacted on the front end actually buy the product
Due to the inexperience of front-end salespeople, telemarketers en-
courage, or sometimes require, fronters to read verbatim from a script
provided by the telemarketer that is designed to induce the customer to
buy the product or service being offered.' A typical script allows the
recipient of the phone call to ask questions and provide certain informa-
tion to the salesperson. The script provides the fronter with different
messages to read depending on the customer's responses to the ques-
tions posed by the fronter."
The questions and responses in the script are designed so that the
fronter can easily overcome any objections to the product or reluctance
to buy.45 In some cases, telemarketers overcome objections to the sales
presentation and reluctance to buy on the front end through the use of
"closers."' Closers are more experienced salespeople, often the manag-
ers of the telemarketing operation, who break into the front-end sales
presentation to make a stronger sales pitch when a fronter is unable to
"close the deal."47
Telemarketers also often employ "chance promotions" or sweepstakes
giveaways to induce customers to buy their products.' In a chance pro-
or service being offered. Id.
43. ROMAN, supra note 21, at 18-19. Like the copy in a print or broadcast adver-
tisement, scripts are designed to convince a potential customer to buy the product.
However, unlike advertising copy, scripts are read directly to the customer and,
therefore, they must take into account the fact that the recipient of the call can raise
objections and ask questions. Id. See also Thomas A DePrizio, Step-by-Step for
Startups: A Review, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEMARKETING, supra note 41, at 532, 538
(discussing different types of scripts).
44. NASH, supra note 26, at 162 ("In some cases [the conversation] moves to
Thanks anyway. Goodbye.' In other situations, it asks other questions or provides
more information.").
45. Id. For an example of a typical telephone script, see id. at 162-68. For infor-
mation regarding the development and use of scripts, see generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TELEMARKETING, supra note 41, at 163. See also F'C v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875
F.2d 564, 567 n.2, 568 (7th Cir. 1989) (sales script for a fraudulent telemarketing
scam involving the sale of "discount travel passports"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954
(1989).
46. Innovation in Telemarketing Frauds and Scams: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy of the House Comm.
on Small Business and the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the House
Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1991) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
47. Id. at 203. Managers can also communicate with fronters over a circuit closed
to the customer to advise the fronter what to say during the conversation. Id.
48. See generally PROMOTION MARKETING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., PROMOTION
MARKETING LAW (Frank T. Dierson, ed. 1991) [hereinafter PROMOTION MARKETING LAW].
Chance promotions are not an essential element of all telemarketing sales presenta-
tions. However, the practice is prevalent throughout the industry and is used heavily
in fraudulent telemarketing scams. Chance promotions are closely regulated by both
federal and state criminal statutes. Id.
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motion, customers are given the opportunity to win substantial prizes in
exchange for listening to the telemarketer's sales presentation.49 In in-
bound programs, the telemarketer uses the chance promotion as part of
a direct mail campaign to induce people to call; in outbound programs,
the telemarketer uses the promotion to keep the person on the phone.'
However, because these promotions closely parallel lotteries, telemar-
keters must operate them very carefully to avoid violating state and fed-
eral laws that regulate chance promotions and prohibit lotteries."
The vast majority of customers contacted by the front-end salespeople
do not buy the telemarketer's products. One study concluded that a 20%
sales rate is the highest rate a telemarketer can expect to realize on
front-end sales efforts, and in many cases the sales rate is much lowern.
Because of the high cost of the calls, the typical telemarketer loses mon-
ey on the front end.' However, by concentrating on customers that pur-
chase the products and attempting to sell more of the product to those
customers, a telemarketer can recoup front-end losses. Telemarketing is
profitable, therefore, through the telemarketer's use of this process,
which is called "reloading."
2. The "Reload"
Once the fronters make a sale, they give the name of the customer to
the more aggressive and experienced back-end salespeople, or
"reloaders."' Reloaders generally work without scripts and rely instead
on their persuasive powers to overcome the customer's objections.'
49. See generally Louis W. STERN & THOMAS L. EOVALDI, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MAR-
KETING STRATEGY: ANTITRUST AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES 446-47 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter LEGAL ASPECTS OF MARKETING STRATEGY] (discussing legal aspects of sales promo-
tion and personal selling practices).
50. Id.
51. For a discussion of lottery laws, see infra, notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
52. STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at 12-16. But see NASH, supra note 26, at 161
(a successful telemarketing campaign might achieve results of 25 to 35 percent re-
sponsiveness).
53. Inbound calls can cost as much as $7.00 each and outbound calls can cost as
much as $16.00. See STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at 152.
54. Interview with Alan B. Pick, Los Angeles, November 18, 1992. Mr. Pick is a
Los Angeles attorney with expertise in telemarketing law.
55. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 18 n.40. One
telemarketer described the method he used to overcome a potential client's request
to discuss the investment with his wife: The telemarketer would attack the client's
"manhood" by asking, "Look down between your legs; do you have any [testicles]
They concentrate on customers who have demonstrated a responsiveness
to phone solicitations and a willingness to buy products over the
phone.' The reloaders make repeated calls to the customers to sell
more of the product. 7 They often re-enter the customer in chance pro-
motions offered by the telemarketing firm and use the chance promotion
as a carrot to induce more sales at increasing prices to the consumer.'
As the discussion of Teresa Angle's9 experience demonstrates, many
fraudulent telemarketers will continue to reload the customers until the
customer has no money left to spend.' Fraudulent telemarketers reload
the victims of the fraud repeatedly until complaints begin to mount and
the authorities begin to close in. At that point, the fraudulent
telemarketers will make "drop" calls offering larger discounts and more
substantial prizes."' Shortly thereafter, the telemarketers "bust out."
They close down the operation, move to a different area, and set up the
same or a similar scam again.'
The qualities that have made telemarketing appealing to legitimate
businesses have also drawn scam artists willing to use the technology to
swindle unsuspecting consumers out of billions of dollars per year.'
The illicit use of telemarketing has sullied the image of telemarketing for
down there? Who wears the pants in your family?" Id. This same telemarketer dem-
onstrated to House staffers that he could sell "goat manure" by overcoming any ques-
tions or concerns raised by the staffers. Id. The House committee concluded that the
telemarketer "proved his point: You can sell almost anything with the right pitch and
the right manner." Id.
56. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54.
57. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 19. One fraudulent
telemarketer said: "Once a first sale was completed, [we] immediately reapproached
the client within the week to effect further sales. The objective was to steal as much
money from the victim as possible within a 2-month period." Id. (emphasis omitted).
58. See Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 203-04 (testimony of Kenneth M. Hearst,
Assistant Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigations).
59. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
60. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 18-19. One fraudu-
lent telemarketer described the role of the reloaders in an illegal telemarketing
scheme: "The reloaders . . .would ascertain how much [money] the customer had,
where they had their investments, and through very elaborate prepared pitches, set
about to bilk the customer out of as much money as they could." Id.
61. See Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 204.
62. Id. "One of the most insidious aspects of boiler room fraud is the ease with
which the owners and sales people move among the boiler rooms. After a 'Bust
Out,' . . . operators easily go back into business at other boiler rooms or under other
names." Id.
63. 138 CONG. REC. H9, 693 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1992) (statement of Rep. Swift).
Estimates of the annual losses to Americans resulting from telemarketing fraud vary
widely. The National Consumer's League estimates the losses at $15 billion per year.
Id. The Federal Trade Commission estimates'that telemarketing fraud may cause
losses of as much as $40 billion annually. Id.
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honest businesses' and has made consumers, who could benefit from
legitimate telemarketing, leery of buying goods or services over the
phone.' The following section will detail some of the more common
scams employed by fraudulent telemarketers.
B. Fraudulent Schemes Employed by Telemarketers
State and federal authorities broadly define telemarketing fraud to
encompass any scheme in which a telephone or other form of wire com-
munication is used to defraud the public." While fraudulent
telemarketing schemes employ many of the same techniques used by
scams not employing a phone,67 the telephone adds a significant element
of deception. A sophisticated telemarketer can use his powers of persua-
sion to paint a "word picture" in the mind of his client." A
telemarketer's skill in using these "word pictures" greatly increases the
salesperson's ability to convince a purchaser to spend money on the
64. Telemarketing fraud has become so prevalent, well publicized, and entrenched,
most articles and legislative reports focus only on fraudulent telemarketers and grudg-
ingly admit that many legitimate telemarketers provide an invaluable service to con-
sumers. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992) ("The Committee
recognizes that legitimate telemarketing activities are ongoing in everyday business
and may provide a useful service to both business operations and their customers."
[emphasis added]).
65. See Hearing on S. 2213, H.R. 4104, S. 2326, supra note 15, at 62.
66. See THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 3. The House
Report points out that telemarketing fraud always contains unfair or deceptive busi-
ness practices, but defines it more broadly than common-law fraud. Common-law
fraud contains the following six elements: (1) misrepresentation, (2) scienter, (3) an
intent to induce the victim's reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) actual reliance, (5)
justifiable reliance, and (6) damages. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-26
(1981).
Fraudulent telemarketing scams usually do not contain all six of the elements
because authorities often cannot prove that the salesman had the requisite intent. THE
SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 3 n.4. This is especially true
with front-end sales presentations because the salespeople read directly from scripts.
Nevertheless, even though all the elements cannot be proven, the House Report con-
cludes that "'fraudulent' is the most appropriate word." Id. This Comment will follow
the House Report's broad definition of "telemarketing fraud," which includes unfair
and deceptive, although possibly not fraudulent, practices.
67. Id. at 3.
68. See H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1992) ("[Tjelemarketers may
attempt to deceive by painting 'word pictures' over the telephone that deliberately
obscure or create mistaken assumptions in the minds of consumers . . ").
fraudulent scam.' Fraudulent telemarketers play upon the client's fears
and emotions in ways that would be difficult or impossible in a face-to-
face meeting.7" In addition, they can tailor their sales presentations to
appeal to the consumer, using different techniques for different types of
people.7' The fraudulent telemarketers' expertise in the use of these
powerful tools of deception continues to increase as new scams are de-
veloped every day.
The variety of scams involving the phone constantly increases because
"boiler room operators are ingenious at coming up with schemes to sell
almost anything, depending on what is a 'hot' item at that point in
time."' Boiler room operators are especially adept at determining the
fears shared by many people and capitalizing on those fears. For exam-
ple, during the U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf region preceding
the war with Iraq, many boiler room operators, detecting fears of higher
fuel prices, began selling partnerships in oil and gas leases and gasoline
treatment products that they claimed would boost the octane of the gas
and increase fuel efficiency.'
69. Because a great number of boiler rooms are located in Southern California,
many firms employ out-of-work actors as salespeople. Carol Angel, Prosecutors Focus
on Boiler Rooms and Other Scams, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 12, 1988, at 1. Former Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney David A. Katz, coordinator of the Southern California Fraud Task
Force, said that for these salespeople, working in a boiler room is "[ejssentially ...
an acting job. Many of them are aware of the illegal nature of what they are do-
ing ...[blut they don't have trouble with the idea of giving a pitch, being charm-
ing." Id. at 26.
70. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 3-4. Telemarketers
are able to design their sales presentations to appeal to customers in various ways.
One telemarketer convinced an 81-year-old widow to mortgage her house and invest
in fraudulent oil and gas partnerships by calling once a week to read the Bible with
her. Id. at 6.
71. Id. at 21-22. One fraudulent telemarketer said that there are "two ways to sell:
fear or greed .... [A] good pitch would hit both areas." Id. at 18. When discussing
the sales of oil and gas leases, the telemarketer said that if he were talking to a
"mooch," or a greedy investor, he would "design the pitch as if we were dealing with
a sophisticated investor." Id. at 17. He would not go into the details of the invest-
ment, instead discussing the oil industry in general. Id.
72. Id. at 15.
73. Elyse Tanouye, "Operation Desert Scams" Nab Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14,
1991, at Cl. Boiler room operators routinely told "investors" that oil prices were cer-
tain to go "sky-high" and that investments would yield returns of 85% or more. Id.
Although fraudulent telemarketers predicted prices of $60 per barrel, crude oil actual-
ly dropped to $21 after allied bombing began. Id.
Other boiler room operators have been able to use the current economic reces-
sion to their advantage. "Foreclosure counselors" often "disappear after extracting
$500 to help mortgage holders about to be booted from their homes." Get Smart
About Scams, USA TODAY, July 15, 1992, at 10A. Also, some telemarketers scammed
consumers by offering "advance fee loans" to consumers "regardless of credit histo-
ry." David Holmstrom, Scams Ifiltrate Phone Lines, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
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Due to the wide variety of scams and the ingenuity of fraudulent
telemarketers in devising new ones, fraudulent telemarketing scams defy
easy categorization. 4 However, there are several common scams that
can be grouped into the following categories, discussed in greater detail
below: (1) investment scams; (2), illegal lotteries; (3) 900-number scams;
(4) credit card factoring/merchant credit card accounts; and (5) bank
drafts. This list is illustrative of common telemarketing scams but is
certainly not exhaustive.
1. Investment Scams
In investment scams, fraudulent telemarketers mislead the consumers
into believing that they have invested their money in legitimate, stable
ventures that will provide them with a generous return.' These scams
often involve the sale of coins and precious metals,6 gems,7" real es-
tate,' and oil and gas leases.'
Mar. 2, 1992, at 8. After the consumer pays a $200 to $300 processing fee, the boiler
room operator tells him that he did not qualify for the loan or merely mails him
standard loan applications. Id.
74. See THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 14-16.
75. The Nature and Extent of Telemarketing Fraud, supra note 1, at 8. For exam-
ple, Grace Singletary, an 84 year old widow, testified before a House subcommittee
that she had been duped into investing $20,000 in a movie-production scam. At first,
the salesman promised Mrs. Singletary that she would receive 2 times her invest-
ment Later, when it appeared that she was leery of investing in the scam, the sales-
man promised Mrs. Singletary that the investment was a "23-to-I deal." Id. at 7-10.
76. See infra notes 1-13 and accompanying text. See also FTC v. Security Rare
Coins, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22, 801 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendants agreed to
sign consent decree settling charges that they had misrepresented investment potential
of coins); David Zigas & Gall DeGeorge, Trade Metals! Little Money Down! Lose a
Bundle Quick!, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 29, 1990, at 87.
77. See, e.g., FTC v. Kimberly Int'l Gem Corp. [1983-87 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 22, 282 (August 19, 1985) (defendants stipulated to permanent injunc-
tions and default judgments and agreed to pay $280,000 in redress for misrepresent-
ing the investment potential of colored gemstones).
78. See generally Ralph E. Stone, The Federal Trade Commission and Timeshare
Resale Companies, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 49 (1990). Real estate scams often involve
the resale of timeshare condominiums, where the purchaser buys the right to use the
property for a certain number of days per year. See also FTC v. PM Marketing Mas-
ters, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22, 760 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (court issued tempo-
rary restraining orders restraining defendants from engaging in deceptive practices in
the sale of timeshare interests).
79. Tanouye, supra note 73, at Cl.
As an illustration of how an investment scam works, consider the
following. Kilgore Mining Company (KMC) solicited customers by phone,
offering land for sale containing "guaranteed" coal deposits.' Salesmen
sent brochures to people who expressed interest; the brochures con-
tained falsified geology reports and Dun and Bradstreet reports on KMC's
financial condition."1 Salesmen gave potential customers the names and
phone numbers of "previously satisfied investors" who gave glowing
reports of profitable investments through KMC.' The "satisfied inves-
tors" were actually "shills" paid by KMC for their fraudulent misrepresen-
tations.83
Customers who bought the land from KMC received a letter stating
that they had purchased the entire property, including subsurface coal
rights. However, KMC owned only an option on the surface rights of the
land it was selling and never owned any mineral rights in the land. In
fact, even if KMC had owned mineral rights, they would have been
worthless: the coal that had once lay beneath the track had been previ-
ously mined.' Investors later learned that the land they had bought
was worthless.' An FBI investigation of KMC resulted in the conviction
of KMC's president, vice president, and two salesmen for mail and wire
fraud and various other fraud counts.87
2. Illegal Lotteries
Fraudulent telemarketers often operate illegal lotteries. As discussed
above, many legitimate telemarketers use chance promotions or sweep-
stakes giveaways to induce consumers to buy their products. However,
fraudulent telemarketers operate such promotions in violation of federal
and state laws. Boiler room operators consider the products they sell to
be of little or no importance, and usually the products are of inferior
quality and grossly overpriced.' To sell these products, the salespeople
80. United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1036 (1990).
81. Id. at 1411-12. A letter sent to potential investors also guaranteed investors "a
minimum of 3000 tons of recoverable coal on each parcel." Id. at 1415.
82. Id. at 1412.
83. Id. The shills received $300 for each potential consumer with whom they
spoke. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1415. The letter stated: "[Y]ou are not purchasing just the coal reserves,
you will receive a full deed on the property. It's actually your land." Id.
87. Id. at 1412. The four men, along with others, were indicted by a grand jury on
154 counts. The court sentenced the president to 20 years in prison, the vice presi-
dent to 16 years, and the salesmen to 5 years. Id.
88. Boiler room salespeople often mislead consumers about the price or quality of
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entice consumers with promises of prizes that are non-existent or of
exaggerated value.'
Legitimate telemarketers who sell their products by using chance pro-
motions must be extremely careful not to run afoul of state and federal
lottery laws.' While the definition of "lottery" varies among jurisdic-
tions,"' the laws generally state that a promotion is a lottery if a prize is
offered for the winner, the awarding of the prize is based on chance and
not skill, and participants in the promotion are required to give up some-
thing of value, or "consideration," to enter.' To comply with state and
local laws, legitimate telemarketers who wish to run a chance promotion
must eliminate the consideration element from the promotion.'
The question of whether a particular chance promotion requires en-
trants to provide consideration is difficult to resolve, and the determina-
tion varies among jurisdictions.' In most jurisdictions, a chance promo-
tion will not be an illegal lottery unless it requires the participant to
the items. One scam advertised, "Enough vitamins to last a whole year-for just
'three ninety-five.'" Six hundred consumers in Connecticut signed up, believing that
they were obligated to pay $3.95. However, when the bill came, the consumers re-
alized that they each owed $395.00. Mark Pazniokas, Telemarketing Fraud Becomes
Target of State Legislation, THE HARTFORD COuRANT, Feb. 28, 1992, at DI.
89. Holmstrom, supra note 73, at 8 ("A woman in Oklahoma responded to a post-
card indicating that she had won a prize She was persuaded to buy about $600
worth of vitamins with her credit card. She never received a prize.").
90. LEGAL ASPECTS OF MARKETING STRATEGY, supra note 49, at 446. Most states
proscribe all gambling, including lotteries. In addition, "[t]he Federal Trade Commis-
sion considers all lotteries to be unfair or deceptive (unless permitted under state
law), and the Federal Communications Act prohibits broadcasters from transmitting
information about lotteries." Id.
91. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1307(d) (1982) (defining lottery as "the pooling of pro-
ceeds derived from the sale of tickets or chances and allotting those proceeds or
parts thereof by chance to one or more chance takers or ticket purchasers"); CAL
PENAL CODE § 319 (West 1988) ("[A] lottery is any scheme for the disposal or distri-
bution of property by chance, among persons who have paid or promised to pay any
valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining such property or a portion of it.");
N.Y. PENAL CODE § 225.00(10) (McKinney 1989) (defining lottery as "an unlawful gam-
bling scheme in which (a) the players pay or agree to pay something of value ... ;
(b) the winnfers] are to be determined by ... some ... method based upon the
element of chance; and (c) the holders of the winning chances are to receive some-
thing of value.").
92. PROMOTION MARKETING LAW, supra note 48, at 03.3. See also LEGAL ASPECTS OF
MARKETING STRATEGY, supra note 49, at 446.
93. LEGAL ASPECTS OF MARKETING STRATEGY, supra note 49, at 446.
94. Id.
purchase goods or services to be eligible to receive a prize." Merely
making a phone call, visiting a retail establishment, or mailing in an entry
form will not suffice to make a chance promotion an illegal lottery.'
To comply with state and federal law, most telemarketers operating
chance promotions require that all fronters clearly state that no consider-
ation is necessary for the potential customer to win a prize.' In illegal
sweepstakes, however, the salesperson misrepresents to the consumer
that the consumer must purchase the product or that the consumer will
have a greater chance of winning the top prize in the giveaway if he pur-
chases the telemarketer's product.' This, of course, converts the chance
promotion into an illegal lottery and subjects the salesperson and the
telemarketing fu-m to criminal as well as civil penalties.'
95. Id.
96. Id. California recently enacted a statute allowing the use of 900-numbers in
chance promotions when specified disclosures are made in all advertising for the 900
number. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17539.5(d) (West Supp. 1993). Thus, California has
made it clear that it does not consider the 900-number charges to be consideration.
But see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 945.01(5)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Wisconsin defines con-
sideration as "anything which is a commercial or financial advantage to the promoter
or a disadvantage to any participant." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, under Wis-
consin law, any burden, including phone calls, could be construed as consideration.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF MARKETING STRATEGY, supra note 49, at 446.
97. PROMOTION MARKETING LAW, supra note 48, at 01.3. This is a major factor in
most legitimate telemarketers' decisions to develop scripts. The Promotion Marketing
Association of America, a leading promotion and marketing trade organization, states:
"The 'No Purchase Required' legend is a common and useful addition to the rules of
a chance promotion for it signals the absence of the element of chance." Id. Further,
a telemarketer should not suggest that a potential customer's chances of winning a
more valuable prize will increase if the customer buys the telemarketer's product.
"Such qualification converts the promotion into an illegal lottery. Purchasers and non-
purchasers must be dealt with on equal terms without discrimination." Id.
98. See, e.g., Federal Indictments Charge 32 in Telemarketing Scheme, UPI, July 7,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Consumers received postcards in-
forming them that they had been chosen to receive a valuable prize. When they
called the number, they were told that they had to either purchase a water purifier
or a home security system for nearly $500 or pay a $12.95 entry fee to be eligible to
receive the award. Consumers were also falsely told that the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency was going to make water purifiers mandatory and that the security sys-
tem would lower their insurance premiums. Id.
99. Scripts help to reduce the chances that front-end salespeople working for legiti-
mate telemarketers will misrepresent the nature of the promotion to customers. How-
ever, salespeople will sometimes go beyond the script in an attempt to induce a sale.
For this reason, many telemarketing attorneys recommend that managers of
telemarketing firms closely monitor their front-end salespeople by randomly listening
in on sales presentations. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54.
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3. 900-Number Scams
Boiler room operators keep abreast of technological advances in tele-
communications and capitalize quickly on new technologies." One
such technology that fraudulent telemarketers exploit is the 900 num-
ber."°' The public benefits substantially from 900 numbers, which offer
useful information such as weather, sports scores, time, and road condi-
tions in an efficient and inexpensive manner."°2 However, fraudulent
telemarketers have realized the potential profits they can earn from 900
numbers and use the technology in a growing number and expanding
variety of illegal scams."°
In the most common scam, the fraudulent telemarketer uses the 900
number to market non-existent or inferior goods or services. Consumers,
therefore, "must incur a charge before they can learn whether the prod-
uct is of any use to them." "°4 One such scam involved an offer to pro-
vide "gold" and "platinum" credit cards. Advertisements placed by two
companies, First Capital Financial and Interactive Communications Tech-
100. Barry Cutler, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission before the Select
Committee on Aging, in RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, at 7 (PLI Corp. L.
& Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B4-6985, 1991) [hereinafter RECENT TRENDS IN
TELEMARKETING FRAUD].
101. Id. at 8. Numbers containing the prefix "900" are charged to the consumer's
telephone bill at a much higher rate than normal calls. The charges for 900-number
services can be as expensive as four to five dollars per minute. Therefore, 900 num-
bers can be extremely lucrative for fraudulent telemarketers. Id.
Two other factors make 900 numbers attractive for fraudulent telemarketers.
First, because the money is being made over the phone instead of through charges to
customers' credit cards, the telemarketer does not have to meet the stringent require-
ments imposed by credit-card companies for merchant accounts. See infra notes 117-
23 and accompanying text. Second, the phone companies rather than the boiler room
operators collect the money and, thus, are not subject to the requirements of the
Fair Credit Billing Act, discussed infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. H.R.
REP. No. 14, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
102. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 8.
103. Id. See also 46 States Act on Fraudulent "900" Numbers, L.A. TIMES, May 21,
1992, at D7. "Some '900' numbers carry charges of $25 a call or higher, making them
a magnet for unscrupulous operators who use them to defraud." As a result, the
three major long distance carriers, AT&T, Sprint, and MCI, entered into a system
with 46 states' attorneys general to quickly exchange information about fraudulent 900
numbers. Id.
104. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 8; see also H.R.
REP. No. 14, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1991) ("The deceptive solicitations induce
consumers to place the call by misleading them as to the information or product to
be received . . ").
nology, led consumers to believe that the cards were similar to the gold
and platinum cards offered by VISA, American Express, and
MasterCard.' 5 After placing the call and incurring the charges, consum-
ers learned that the "credit cards" allowed them to purchase merchan-
dise only from the telemarketers' catalogs."
In another common scam, the fraudulent telemarketer fails to disclose
the per-minute cost of the call or misrepresents the average costs of
completed calls to the 900 numbers. In one instance, Transworld Courier
Services ran a help-wanted advertisement in the classified section of a
newspaper, seeking construction workers. 7 The advertisement listed a
toll-free 800 number to call, but when a job-seeker called the number, a
recorded message referred him to a 900 number. Neither the newspaper
advertisement nor the recorded message on the 800 number instructed
callers that the charge for a call to the 900 number would be $15 to$18.108
Other concerns with 900 numbers involve promotions that induce chil-
dren to call 900 numbers "for 'free' gifts or stories or to speak to various
cartoon characters or celebrities."'" These services are troubling be-
cause, even if the advertisements disclose the price of the calls, children
can still make the calls without parental consent or supervision. In addi-
tion, parents often cannot determine the nature of the call, which may
not be apparent from the description on the phone bill."'
4. Credit Cards & Factoring
In some fraudulent telemarketing scams, the telemarketers encourage
victims to pay with their credit cards. These boiler room operators prefer
that customers pay for merchandise with credit cards because, in most
cases, customers receive their bill long after the sale is completed. In
most instances, the victims
will usually not find out about the fraud-usually inferior or nonexistent merchan-
dise or services-for several weeks, and then once they discover the fraud or
deception, they will often either deduct the amount involved on the next credit
card bill or seek credit on the following one-long after the telemarketer has been
paid."'
105. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 8-9.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id. Other similar scams refer callers from one 900 number to another 900
number. Also, sometimes advertisements will disclose the price per minute but fail to
mention that there is a minimum length of the call. Id.
109. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 8 n. 19.
110. Id.
111. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 25.
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In addition, many state attorneys general encourage the use of credit
cards because the consumer will be protected under the Fair Credit Bill-
ing Act 2 if the telemarketing operation turns out to be a scam.
1 3
Under the Fair Credit Billing Act, a consumer may contest a credit card
bill by sending written notice to the credit card issuer regarding the dis-
pute."4 The credit card issuer must investigate, and if it cannot verify
the charges within ninety days, it must credit the card holder's account
for the amount of the charge."5
When a business accepts credit cards for payment, the business must
enter into a merchant account agreement with a bank, which will pro-
cess the charges for the credit card company."' When a consumer re-
quests a chargeback under the Fair Credit Billing Act, the merchant bank
and the credit card company suffer the loss."7 Often, by the time the
merchant bank and credit card company learn of the fraudulent scheme,
the boiler room has been closed and the fraudulent telemarketers have
moved to a different location."8
Because of the losses suffered by merchant banks and credit card
companies, credit card companies and financial institutions have signifi-
cantly limited telemarketers' access to merchant accounts."9 As a re-
sult, telemarketing firms, both fraudulent and legitimate, find it difficult
to open merchant accounts to process credit card charges.'20 Therefore,
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602, 1610, 1631, 1632, 1637, 1666-1666j (1988).
113. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 25 n.58. Some
telemarketers use the Fair Credit Billing Act to their advantage, telling customers that
they are entitled to a chargeback if they are not satisfied with the merchandise. Id.
at 27.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (1988).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B) (1988).
116. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 28-29. The credit
card companies require the merchant banks to investigate businesses applying for
these agreements. However, the merchant banks sometimes do not fully investigate
and often never make an on-site inspection. The result is that many of these banks
suffer the losses from fraudulent telemarketing. Id.
117. Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 168-69. The bank or financial institution that
issued the credit card is usually reimbursed for the losses by the bank that initially
processed the fraudulent transaction for the merchant. Id.
118. Id. at 165-66. In fact, "[m]any current telemarketing schemes purposefully are
structured to involve significant time delays between the time at which charges in-
curred on the credit card and the delivery of the promised goods or services." Id.
The delay increases the likelihood that credit card companies will not find out about
the scam until too late.
119. Id. at 172.
120. Id. at 172-73. VISA and MasterCard require that, prior to granting a merchant
many fraudulent telemarketers, induce legitimate companies that have
credit card merchant accounts to "factor" or "launder" their credit card
drafts for a percentage of the sale.2 ' These laundering arrangements
allow fraudulent telemarketers to "circumvent the safeguards the credit
card systems and the financial institutions... have established to pre-
clude access by the fraudulent operator."2'
5. Bank Drafts
In addition to encouraging victims to pay by credit card, fraudulent
telemarketers defraud consumers by taking money directly out of the
victim's checking account. Direct debiting of a consumer's checking ac-
count can be proper and legal when done appropriately.'23 However,
fraudulent telemarketers often abuse the process.24 The House Commit-
tee on Government Operations described how a debit draft scam can be
operated. First, a fraudulent telemarketer sends postcards notifying con-
sumers that they have won a prize, typically a car or cashier's check.
When a customer calls to claim the prize, the telemarketer tells the con-
sumer that he must pay shipping charges of approximately $400. Rather
than obtain credit card information, the telemarketer obtains the
customer's checking account number, telling him that they will not debit
his account until he is satisfied with the prize.'25
The telemarketer then imprints the information onto a bank draft with
the customer's name, address, telephone number, and a dollar
amount.'26 The bank processes the fraudulent drafts in the same man-
ner as a check, even though the drafts do not have an authorizing signa-
account to a business, all member financial institutions conduct credit checks and/or
financial background investigations, physically inspect the merchant's place of busi-
ness, and research the VISA and MasterCard databases to determine whether the
merchant had been previously involved in fraud. VISA and MasterCard also indepen-
dently investigate merchants with an unusually high number of chargebacks. Id.
121. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 9. The commis-
sions often range from 6 to 15 percent. Some merchants launder as much as
$100,000 in credit-card charges per day for large telemarketing firms. Id.
122. Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 174.
123. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 10.
124. Id. The Rhode Island Attorney General told a House subcommittee, "[Tihe
potential for this process is frightening. It has a very real potential for undermining
the financial security of citizens from all walks of life." Joint Hearing, supra note
46, at 2. It also demonstrates the weakness in "the manner in which the financial
network in our society allows for the transfer of funds." Id.
125. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 30.
126. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 10.
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ture. This has become possible because most banks, in order to deal
with the large volume of checks they process, use bulk filing, making it
impossible to monitor all checks. '27
Many victims of this type of scam do not realize that they have opened
their accounts to unauthorized withdrawals. Usually before the victims
can seek any recourse, the fraudulent telemarketer has closed the oper-
ation and moved on to another city.'" Victims often continue to suffer
unauthorized withdrawals because unscrupulous telemarketers will often
sell the victims' account numbers to other scam artists.'"
Fraudulent telemarketers obtain consumers' account numbers in other
ways as well. Some tell customers that they need the information for
"verification" purposes only. Later, when the consumers receive their
bank statements, they discover that money has been siphoned from their
accounts.'" In other instances, fraudulent telemarketers charge custom-
ers for an amount higher than the customer authorized.'3'
The number and variety of fraudulent scams continue to increase as
fraudulent telemarketers invent sophisticated new schemes, capitalizing
on hot products and public fears. Fraudulent telemarketers employ in-
creasingly more effective methods to persuade consumers to part with
their money. It is imperative that legislation be enacted that is designed
to stop these fraudulent practices. The problems can only be remedied
through a concerted effort between federal, state, and local authorities.
Although the scams may be difficult to categorize, some scams and
methods are quite common. As the next section demonstrates, the vic-
tims of telemarketing fraud are as diverse as the tactics employed to
cheat them.
C. The Victims of Telemarketing Fraud
A single boiler room operation can easily defraud consumers on a
national scale.'" Telemarketing fraud costs American consumers be-
127. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 30. Telemarketers
also might process the drafts electronically, thus eliminating the problem of signa-
tures. Id.
128. Id. at 31.
129. Id.
130. RECENT TRENDS IN TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 100, at 10.
131. Id.
132. H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992) ("Telemarketing differs from
other sales activities in that it can be carried on without any direct contact between
tween $15 and $40 billion annually."n Telemarketing fraud, therefore, is
a national problem that impacts people from all parts of the country and
from all walks of life."u In addition, telemarketing fraud results in more
subtle costs to the American economy in general. Because fraudulent
telemarketers may not report their illegally obtained funds as income, the
IRS loses millions of dollars per year in taxes.1' Also, the economy suf-
fers a loss of investment capital that would otherwise finance legitimate
business opportunities."i
The victims of telemarketing fraud are difficult to categorize because it
affects all Americans. However, due to the manner in which boiler rooms
operate, certain groups bear a greater percentage of the losses. The el-
derly, businesses, financial institutions, and legitimate telemarketing
firms are generally the groups that are hit hardest by telemarketing
fraud.
1. The Elderly
Boiler room operators intentionally focus on older Americans and prey
upon the elderly's desire to increase their limited income. One convicted
boiler room operator stated:
We targeted the.., elderly in our fraud. Retirees were easily accessible by
phone [and] usually at home during the day .... We found the elderly intent on
enlarging their nest egg... and often interested in generating money for their
grandchildren .... The elderly are vulnerable because their memory is poor [and]
they rarely memorialize phone conversations into writing .... But, perhaps their
most notable weakness is that once they recognize the deceit, they are often too
embarrassed to relay the events to... local law enforcement.37
One elderly victim testified before the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations that she had been "ill over th[e] fraudulent transaction,"
sellers who may be based in one State and customers who may be based in another
State.").
133. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
134. Denise Gellene, FBI Launches 12-State Telemarketing Sweep; Fraud: Au-
thorities Arrest Dozens and Impound Property Worth More Than $1 Million in a
Nationwide Crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at Dl. One estimate stated that
nine out of ten Americans have received at least one "suspicious solicitation" over
the telephone. Following a twelve-city telemarketing crackdown, FBI Director William
Sessions stated that he expected to find victims of the raided companies in "virtually
every state of the union." Id.
135. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 7.
136. Id. at 8.
137. The Nature and Extent of Telemarketing Fraud, supra note 1, at 2. See also
Tracy Everbach, Five in Area Charged in Alleged National Telemarketing Scam, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, June 3, 1993, at D2. FBI agent Randal Harris testified that defen-
dant telemarketers claimed their best clients were "the elderly, people who are over
60 and are lonely and enjoy getting a phone call." Id.
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and that she could not bear to tell her son, and only living relative, about
it."3 Indeed, in some cases, this reluctance on the part of retirees to
come forward has been a boon to fraudulent telemarketers and has seri-
ously hampered the efforts of law enforcement officials to curb fraudu-
lent practices.' Without the victims of these frauds reporting to the
proper authorities, federal, state, and local officials will continue to have
a difficult time combatting the scams. In addition, because telemarketing
fraud goes under-reported, federal and state authorities generally devote
fewer resources to eliminating the problem.4 '
Telemarketing fraud often has devastating effects on the elderly. In
investment scams, which require victims to invest large sums of money,
private citizens often lose their entire savings.' Many elderly victims
have had to cut back their monthly expenditures as a result of fraud, and
some have had to take low-paying jobs to survive.'42 In addition, the
fraudulent telemarketing scams often leave the elderly victims in great
fear of facing the future without any savings to rely upon.'"
2. Businesses
Businesses are also a prime target of boiler room operators. Fraudu-
lent telemarketers often perpetrate their frauds upon businesses by pos-
138. The Nature and Extent of Telemarketing Fraud, supra note 1, at 10.
139. See Telemarketing Fraud Legislation, The Rueter Transcript Report, Mar. 10,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (statement of Senator Biden):
When [the elderly] are taken advantage of... they believe they have some-
how done something that if they were more vigilant wouldn't have happened,
they're reluctant to tell anybody.
That's why [fraudulent telemarketers] prey on the elderly. They do it
because they know of [the elderly's] pride, and they know of their unwilling-
ness to tell their son, their daughter ... what happened to them. They're
embarrassed. They're ashamed. And, in a way, it's a cover that these scam
artists have available to them.
Id.
140. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 2.
141. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 1, at 7-10
(Grace Singletary, an 84 year old widow was duped into investing $20,000, her entire
life savings, in a phony movie scam).
142. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 5-6.
143. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 1, at 10. Grace
Singletary described the severe emotional distress she had suffered as a result of the
telemarketing scam: "I have been emotionally and mentally drained. I have not been
able to sleep nor act like myself, according to my friends .... I worry constantly
about a future without any savings." Id.
ing as legitimate office supply companies. In these scams, a boiler-room
operator calls a business and asks to speak to the person in charge of
ordering supplies for the business. Once the contact is on the line, the
boiler room operator represents himself as that business' regular office
supply vendor and encourages the contact to buy supplies by telling him
that the prices are about to be raised.'
After the first shipment of supplies has been made, the reloaders call
the contact at the company and offer to send him a free gift (often to his
home address) to "express appreciation for the order."' The scam then
becomes blackmail because the contact, whom boiler room operators
call a "mooch,"4 ' participates in the scam, fearful that his boss will
learn that he has accepted gifts.'47 After the reloader has placed the
mooch in this position, he can continue to sell overpriced office supplies
because he may always exploit the fear of the mooch.48 In one in-
stance, a company was charged $1,113 (plus $234 for shipping) for 8 " x
11" paper valued at $36 and $29.95 for a box of 1,000 paper clips.'49
One investigator called the victims of an office-supply scam operated
out of a boiler room in California and found over 3,000 victims of that
scam alone."w This investigator estimated that office-supply scams in
California alone are a $200-million-a-year business. 5' He testified before
a House subcommittee that he could not find one business or charity
that had not been contacted by some kind of office-supply scam. He said
that "every receptionist, bookkeeper, and purchasing agent that he con-
tacted in his research knew exactly what he was talking about-and he
found very few who had avoided becoming a victim."'52
Although telemarketing fraud aimed at businesses is widespread and
ever-increasing, federal and state law enforcement agencies have not
devoted the resources to combatting this type of fraud as they have to
halting telemarketing fraud targeting individuals." This disparity may
144. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 23.
145. Id.
146. Id. "[A] mooch is someone who takes a gift in return for ordering office prod-
ucts at extremely inflated prices. The gift is nothing more than a commercial bribe."
Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Orlo Ellison testified to the House Committee on Government Operations
that whenever the mooch in his company would protest a shipment or a bill, the
reloader would say, "Well, let me talk to your boss, maybe he would like to have a
television sent to his house." Mr. Ellison said that, in effect, these scams amount to
"tele-blackmail." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 24.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 24-25.
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stem from a feeling of "greater sympathy for individuals over business-
es, "154 which may be understandable though not wholly justified."
Nevertheless, unlike the elderly, businesses can better protect themselves
against telemarketing fraud without the aid of the government and, there-
fore, should be responsible for educating themselves of the potential
dangers. Telemarketing fraud will continue to plague businesses unless
businesses not only learn about the dangers of telemarketing fraud but
also complain loudly enough to law enforcement officials to force them
to devote the resources necessary to combat the fraud.
3. Financial Institutions
One industry suffering greatly from fraudulent telemarketing is the
banking industry. Two major credit card companies, VISA and
MasterCard, have watched with growing concern the increased number
of chargebacks" resulting from telemarketing fraud and the consequent
losses to their member financial institutions. The companies recently
estimated that financial institutions lose over $300 million per year in
telemarketing frauds involving payment by credit card."7 For example,
several banks suffered losses due to telemarketing fraud in excess of $1
million each, and two had suffered losses of more than $2.5 million
each." In addition to these "direct" losses from chargebacks, financial
institutions must spend millions of dollars annually on the processing of
chargebacks, the investigation of fraudulent telemarketers, and the devel-
opment and implementation of procedures designed to limit fraudulent
telemarketers' access to the credit-card system."
Financial institutions in general are aware of the magnitude of the
problem and are actively involved in the efforts to develop new laws."M
154. Id. at 25.
155. It is not unusual for businesses to lose over $100,000 through fraudulent office
supply scams, while losses of that magnitude by individuals are uncommon. See id.
at 27.
156. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
157. S. REP. No. 80, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993).
158. Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 168-69. In 1990, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency reported that the failure of one national bank was due, in part, to
losses from telemarketing fraud. Id. at 169.
159. Id. at 169.
160. Representatives of VISA and MasterCard have testified at Congressional hear-
ings and have submitted written reports to aid Congress in the drafting of appropri-
ate legislation. See, e.g., Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 162.
With the aid of the banking industry, the federal government should en-
act laws that protect the public as well as financial institutions from the
damage inflicted by fraudulent telemarketers.
4. Legitimate Telemarketers
Three hundred thousand legitimate telemarketers nationwide generate
$435 billion in sales each year,"' and most major businesses today con-
duct at least some of their operations by way of telemarketing.'" These
businesses, and several telemarketing industry groups, have realized that
the growth of fraudulent telemarketing scams severely hampers their
efforts to conduct business over the phone.'" Joan Mullen,. president of
the Telemarketing Division of Zacson Corporation, testified before a Con-
gressional subcommittee on behalf of the American Telemarketing Asso-
ciation (ATA) that telemarketing fraud has a significant negative impact
on legitimate telemarketers:
Telemarketing fraud not only makes victims of the public, it also victimizes le-
gitimate telemarketers who are negatively affected by abuses. Most businesses
that use telemarketing do so in a conscientious and professional manner. The
significance of ethical standards is clearly understood and the necessity of profes-
sionalism is critical to success in this competitive environment.
Although press coverage frequently indicates otherwise, only a small percentage
of businesses engage in fraudulent activity over the telephone. As in all other
cases of business fraud, there is a great deal of sensationalism. Nevertheless, it is
devastating to all concerned to the duped and cheated consumers and businesses
as well as to the legitimate telemarketers who must combat the negative ef-
fects."4
In addition to creating a negative impression of telemarketing in the
minds of many consumers, the growth of fraudulent telemarketing has
"created an atmosphere of fear and distrust in the banking communi-
161. Tehrani, supra note 14, at 88.
162. STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at 2. Bob Stone and John Wyman list 120
major companies, such as IBM, Pepsico, Ford Motor Company, and Sears Roebuck &
Co., that employ telemarketing in at least one facet of their operations. Id.
163. Ted Schwartz on Telemarketing, Quality and Service Agencies, TELEMARKETING,
Mar. 1992, at 24. Ted G. Schwartz, president and CEO of APAC TeleServices, one of
the largest telemarketing firms in the country, realizes fraudulent telemarketing has
had a negative impact on the industry in general. He says, "One unpleasant call made
by an unscrupulous operator will unfortunately leave a negative impression on a con-
sumer." Id.
164. Hearing on S. 2213, H.R. 4104, and S. 2326, supra note 15, at 62; see also
Telemarketing Fraud: Hearing on S. 2213 and HR. 4104 Before the Subcomm. on
the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1988) (John T. Hamilton, Vice President and President-Elect of
the ATA stated: "[The] ATA abhors all forms of fraud, whether by telephone, direct
mall or face-to-face .... [Olur profession is being victimized right along with the
people being defrauded.").
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ty.' " As a result, banks and credit-card companies have implemented
stringent requirements on telemarketing firms that wish to process cred-
it-card orders through merchant accounts.'m These requirements have
had a negative impact on legitimate telemarketers, many of whom have
had their merchant accounts terminated without warning.167
Another factor that affects legitimate telemarketers is the lack of uni-
formity among state laws.'" In the absence of federal legislation, states
must formulate statutes to deal with the fraudulent telemarketing prob-
lem.'69 The disparity between the various state laws makes it difficult
for a legitimate telemarketer to operate with complete confidence that
his actions will not violate any particular state law. 70
Telemarketing organizations have become very involved in efforts to
combat telemarketing fraud. The ATA has developed Telemarketing Stan-
dards and Ethics Guidelines to aid legitimate telemarketers and a con-
sumer guidelines booklet to educate the public. Furthermore, ATA has
aided state and federal authorities in apprehending illegal
telemarketers.'7 ' The Direct Marketing Association (DMA), another lead-
ing telemarketing industry organization, has produced "Guidelines for
Telephone Marketing Practices" and encourages all members to follow
these guidelines.I"
In addition, both the ATA and the DMA are actively involved in efforts
by Congress to enact a federal telemarketing bill, and they serve as the
voice of the legitimate telemarketing industry at many congressional
165. Ronald Dans, CEO Corner: Direct Debiting - An Alternative to Credit Card
Processing, TELEMARKETING, Aug. 1991, at 46.
166. Id. See also supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
167. One telemarketer was terminated even though he had a twelve-year relationship
with his bank, a $1,000,000 line of credit, and less than two-percent chargebacks.
Dans, supra note 165, at 46.
168. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also infra notes 387-99 and accompanying text.
171. Senators Probe Need for Act to Curb Telemarketing Fraud, 63 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1577, at 162 (August 6, 1992); see also Hearing on S.
2213, H.R. 4104, and S., 2326, supra note 15, at 62.
172. Guidelines for Telephone Marketing Practices, reprinted in STONE & WYMAN,
supra note 23, at 205-09. The Guidelines require that telemarketers make calls only
during "reasonable" hours and disclose all pertinent -information, including the name
of the telemarketing firm, the cost of the merchandise, and all other charges, such as
shipping and handling. The Guidelines prohibit telemarketers from using deceptive or
misleading sales tactics and require that they abide by all federal, state, and local
laws. Id.
hearings. The two organizations have observed the efforts of state and
local law enforcement groups in battling telemarketing and have seen
that these efforts have proven ineffective. The ATA and the DMA realize
that the disparate legislative solutions of the states and the varying levels
of funding by different law enforcement agencies have resulted in uneven
enforcement. Therefore, any effective solution to the telemarketing prob-
lem must come from the federal level. The next section will detail the
states' attempts at combatting fraudulent telemarketing.
III. STATE AND LOCAL ArTEMPTS AT COMBATTING TELEMARKETING FRAUD
. In the absence of a federal statutory framework to battle fraudulent
telemarketing practices, states have largely been left to themselves to
combat boiler room operators. State-by-state enforcement activity has re-
sulted in limited success including several convictions and closures of
illegally run boiler rooms.'' Overall, however, attempts by state authori-
ties to combat telemarketing fraud have been ineffective, and state and
federal authorities are now calling for federal legislation. This section
will detail the various attempts by state and local law enforcement agen-
cies and state legislatures to combat fraudulent telemarketing and the
problems they have faced. State telemarketing statutes will be addressed
in significant detail because of their value in providing a framework for
federal legislation.
A. State and Local Law Enforcement Efforts at Combatting
Telemarketing Fraud
Many states have been aggressive in their efforts to combat
telemarketing fraud. State and local law enforcement agencies have ex-
hibited a willingness to devote personnel and resources in an effort to
combat the growth of the fraudulent telemarketing industry.'74 Unfortu-
nately, because of the nature of fraudulent telemarketing, state officials'
efforts have met with only limited success."
Boiler room operators, unlike legitimate telemarketers, are very mobile
and can move from state to state whenever problems are detected by
state authorities.'6 In addition, a boiler room in one state can sell prod-
173. See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
174. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 130-33.
175. See id. at 131. -
176. S. REP. NO. 396, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990). Legitimate telemarketers "gen-
erally operate from a fixed site," thus giving the consumer recourse if problems arise.
Boiler rooms, on the other hand, are "mobile and anonymous," making it difficult for
consumers to seek redress. Id.
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ucts to consumers in the other forty-nine states. Although a boiler room
may have tens of thousands of victims nationwide, the number of known
victims per state may be less than fifty.' Therefore, state officials with
limited jurisdictions and even more limited resources are often unable to
bring cases or seize assets of fraudulent telemarketers in other states. 8
Even when state officials locate a boiler room and prepare to raid it,
they often find it has been closed and the perpetrators of the fraud have
moved on."
Also, state officials have had only limited success in using civil suits as
a method of battling telemarketing fraud. Injunctions and restraining or-
ders from state courts cannot stop fraudulent telemarketers from doing
business in other states."° Usually, out-of-state fraudulent telemarketers
faced with injunctions simply stop doing business in the state granting
the injunction or ignore the order, believing that they are out of the
reach of state officials. 8' The Attorney General of Colorado testified
before a House subcommittee and illustrated the problems state authori-
ties face in combatting telemarketing fraud." The attorney general said
that of the many fraudulent telemarketing operations Colorado authori-
177. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 10. A state official,
therefore, has little motivation to combat telemarketing because it may appear to af-
fect only a few citizens of any particular state. Id.
178. Id. at 10. It is "difficult and costly for State authorities to pursue...
[telemarketing] frauds, because of the difficulty and costs of pursuing telemarketers
hundreds or thousands of miles away." Id. On occasion, however, state officials have
traveled to other states to apprehend boiler room operators. In one case, an employ-
ee of New Mexico's attorney general's office flew to California, located a boiler room
operator with the help of local police, and filed extradition papers. Id. at 101. Al-
though such efforts send a powerful message to fraudulent telemarketers, they are
very costly and occur infrequently.
179. S. REP. No. 396, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1990).
180. H.R. REP. No. 781, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988). In 1984, the State of North
Carolina brought an action against a California boiler room and obtained an injunc-
tion under North Carolina law. In 1987, the State of Illinois sued the same boiler
room and obtained an injunction under Illinois law. In September 1987, the FrC
brought an action against the firm for violations of the FTC Act. This example illus-
trates the ineffectiveness of state enforcement; state enforcement results in "both
uneven protection of consumers and duplicative investigations and court proceedings."
Id.
181. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 11 ("[Wlhen State
agencies obtain injunctive or similar relief, the best they can hope is that out-of-State
telemarketers will cross that State off their map and concentrate their fraudulent
pitches on the 49 others [sic] States.").
182. Id. at 131.
ties attempted to shut down, they had been successful only in eliminating
the portion of the operations occurring within Colorado or effecting
Colorado residents. The authorities could not close down the boiler
room operations in other states."
In some instances, federal authorities have aided state officials, en-
couraging cooperation between states and offering grants to help defer
the cost of investigation and prosecution.'" One example, the Leviticus
Project,'5 was set up by the Justice Department to combat coal, oil and
gas, and precious metals fraud. The Leviticus Project has been effective
in closing many boiler rooms and putting their managers behind bars."
However, federal funding of state telemarketing enforcement has been
narrowly limited. 7 Without more resources, states cannot effectively
combat the fraudulent telemarketers preying on their citizens.'"
Federal law enforcement agencies have been considerably more suc-
cessful. On March 4, 1993, more than 800 FBI agents raided over fifty
telemarketing businesses in twelve states." "Operation Disconnect," as
the raids were called, was said to be the largest telemarketing raid ever
and resulted in the arrest of more than 240 individuals and the seizure of
over $4 million in assets." The raids were the culmination of three
183. Id.
184. Id. at 11. Multi-state efforts are encouraged by federal authorities and can be
an important method for combatting telemarketing fraud. Id.
185. The Leviticus Project was named for the third book of the Bible which states,
"Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbor." Maria L. La Ganga, 5 Seized in Raids on
"Boiler Rooms," L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1989, at A3. The Project is funded by the Justice
Department. Id.
186. Id. With $175,000 supplied by the Leviticus Project, the Los Angeles and Or-
ange County District Attorneys in conjunction with securities officials from several
states, raided 12 boiler rooms in early April 1989 and arrested 5 suspects. This raid,
as well as several others during 1988 and 1989, resulted in 31 criminal prosecutions
as of mid-1991. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 101-02.
187. Because the Leviticus Project's goal is to fight oil and gas, precious metals,
and coal scams, it does not fund raids on boiler rooms conducting other types of
scams. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 102.
188. La Ganga, supra note 185, at A3. Many state and local officials have made it
clear that the main obstacle to enforcement against boiler room operators is funding.
David Katz, assistant U.S. Attorney and head of the Southern California Fraud Task
Force said, "What we've always needed [to fight telemarketing fraud] is more resourc-
es." Id.
189. Gellene, supra note 16, at DI; Jerry Urban, 4 Houston-Area Residents Held in
Phone Sales Scam, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 5, 1993, at A29; Press Release: "Operation
Disconnect," U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney, Western District of New York, Mar.
4, 1993.
190. Gellene, supra note 16, at DI; Urban, supra note 189, at A29; FBI Provides
Update on Telemarketing Fraud, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library (FBI agents seized "over $4 million in bank accounts, weapons, com-
puters, cars, boats, Rolex watches, jet skis and other items").
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years of investigations by the FBI, in which agents posed as sales repre-
sentatives for automatic telephone dialing systems.'9' The success of
"Operation Disconnect," especially in light of the general failure of state
law enforcement efforts, demonstrates the need for concerted efforts
from the federal government to effectively combat fraudulent
telemarketing.
Another major problem facing both state and federal officials alike is
the high incidence of recidivism in telemarketing fraud."9 Boiler rooms
tend to operate as a "training ground" for lower level employees. 3
When state officials succeed in closing down a boiler room, generally
only the principals of the scam are charged." 4 Fronters, most of whom
are not charged, move to other boiler rooms and to higher positions or
begin to operate their own fraudulent scams.95 Shutting down boiler
rooms, therefore, is not always effective; often one closed boiler room
will spawn several more.
These problems in combatting telemarketing fraud at the state level
have led many states to enact comprehensive telemarketing statutes
designed to give state officials the power to close boiler rooms and to
make the opening of new boiler rooms less attractive to fraudulent
telemarketers. However, as demonstrated below, these statutes have also
had limited success, highlighting the need for federal action.
B. State Statutory Solutions
In an attempt to remedy the difficulties faced by law enforcement
officials, several states in the mid to late 1980s began to enact compre-
hensive fraudulent telemarketing statutes aimed at reducing the fraudu-
191. Gellene, supra note 16, at Dl; FBI lov'ides Update on Telemarketing Fraud,
supra note 190. By June 1993, some telemarketers arrested in "Operation Disconnect"
had been convicted. Ten out of eleven defendants from a San Diego boiler room
were found guilty in federal district court. Philip J. LaVelle, 10 Out of 11 Guilty in
Telemnarketing Scam; FBI Applauds Result, Says a Strong Message Sent, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., June 24, 1993, § B, at 2.
192. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 12.
193. Id. at 93.
194. Id. In one instance, five boiler rooms, with 150 to 200 salespeople, were shut
down by federal authorities. Only five individuals, the principals, were criminally pros-
ecuted, "while the almost 200 brokers went free to continue their work elsewhere."
Id. at 94.
195. Id. at 93. "In at least three instances, salesmen at MMPI [an oil and gas leas-
ing boiler room] departed with client files and started their own [oil] and gas and
precious metals boiler room." Id.
lent telemarketers' opportunities to bilk consumers.'w Other states have
recently introduced telemarketing bills in their state legislatures.' 7 The
statutes enacted have focused on the states' goals of providing buyers
with reliable information, safeguarding the public against fraud, deceit
and financial hardship, and "insur[ing], foster[ing], and encourag[ing]
competition and fair dealings among telephonic sellers."'
Although the statutory enactments of the different states vary wide-
ly,'9 many of the statutes contain similar provisions. The statutes gener-
ally: (1) define telemarketing or "telephonic sales;" (2) grant exemptions
from the law to certain types of telemarketers; (3) require that tele-
marketers register with the state attorney general or a state agency; (4)
require telemarketers to post a bond to ensure they will satisfy customer
complaints; (5) require the telemarketer to make certain disclosures to
consumers; and (6) provide remedies for violation of the telemarketing
statute.' In addition, many of the statutes contain strikingly similar
196. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.63.010-.100, 45.68.010-.900 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-95-101 to 49-95-108 (1992); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17511-17511.12 (West 1987
& Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-301 to 6-1-305 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 501.601-.626 (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-1001 to 1010 (Supp. 1992); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 50-670 to 50-675 (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.810-.818 (West 1992);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 599B.010-.250 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.551-.571 (1989); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-61-1 to 5-61-6 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 37-30-1 to 37-30-29
(Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-1501 to 47-18-1510 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 13-26-1 to 13-26-10 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.158.010-.901 (West
Supp. 1992). This list is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of all state
telemarketing laws. Rather, the discussion in this Comment will focus on certain
common provisions of many of the state laws to give the reader a broad overview of
state statutory solutions to telemarketing fraud. For an excellent collection of all
state laws regarding telemarketing, see DIRECT MARKETING ASS'N, TELEMARKETER'S
GUIDE TO STATE LAws: COMPILATION OF STATE LAWS AFFECTING TELEMARKETING (1992).
197. Leah M. Fliter, Telemarketing's Corpus Juris: Discussions of Legislation and
Issues Raised by New Technology, TELEMARKETING, July 1991, at 16. As of April 22,
1991, 42 state legislatures were working on enacting telemarketing statutes. Of the re-
maining eight states, several had already enacted telemarketing statutes. Id.
198. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 17511 (West 1987); see also IDAHO CODE § 48-1001
(Supp. 1992) (purpose of the statute is to "prohibit representations which have the
capacity, tendency, or effect of misleading a purchaser").
199. Some states that have not enacted comprehensive telemarketing statutes to
deal with all fraudulent telemarketing have enacted more limited statutes to deal with
narrow problems, such as Automatic Dialed Announcing Devices (ADAD), e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1498-99 (West Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-
E:1 to E:6 (Supp. 1992); and 900-number or "pay per call" services, e.g., IDAHO CODE
§§ 48-1101 to 1107 (Supp. 1992); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.162.001-.070 (West
Supp. 1992).
200. See Jim Seigler, CEO Corner: Proposal for Change: An Omnibus Telemarketing
Law for Texas, TELEMARKETING, Sept. 1991, at 54 (proposing Texas telemarketing
statute containing provisions regarding licensing, regulatory powers, ADADs, and pro-
viding civil penalties).
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language.2°' Each of the provisions listed above will be discussed in
greater detail below.
1. States' Definitions of "Telemarketing"
State telemarketing statutes differ widely in their definition of
"telemarketing" or "telephonic seller." The definition significantly affects
the way in which a particular statute will be enforced and its overall ef-
fectiveness because the manner in which telemarketing is defined deter-
mines to whom the statute applies. The degree of specificity in the differ-
ent definitions vary widely and some definitions are rife with loopholes
for cunning boiler room operators to exploit.
Nevada and Utah both define telemarketing in very simple terms. Utah
defines "telephone solicitor" as "a person.., or other entity which
makes or places telephone calls for the purpose of selling or soliciting
sales over the telephone." ' Utah, therefore, by its definition of tele-
phone solicitor, exempts inbound programs in which the consumer, and
not the telemarketer, "makes or places" the initial telephone call.'
Nevada's definition includes inbound programs by stating that'a seller is
someone who makes a telephone solicitation, "including one made after
a potential customer has responded to a solicitation sent by mail. " '
However, this definition still exempts some types of inbound pro-
grams.
205
A second group of statutes have somewhat more detailed definitions of
telemarketing. For example, Idaho's statute defines telemarketing as
either (1) "[a]ny unsolicited telephone call ... for the purpose of. . . in-
ducing.., the [recipient] to purchase or invest in goods or services," '
201. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.604(2) (West Supp. 1992) (providing exemption
for "person[s] making calls for religious, charitable, political, educational, or other
noncommercial purposes") with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(b) (West Supp.
1992) (exemption for "person[s] making calls for religious, charitable, political, or
other noncommercial purposes").
202. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-2(4) (Supp. 1992).
203. This, of course, would exempt many illegal lotteries because most
telemarketers operating chance promotions mail out "sweepstakes" certificates advis-
ing consumers to call in.
204. NEv. REV. STAT. § 599B.010(6) (1989).
205. The telemarketer must still make a solicitation. If the telemarketer is not actu-
ally making a solicitation, as with some illegal chance promotions, he or she would
be exempt under Nevada law.
206. IDAHO CODE § 48-1002(10)(a) (Supp. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.603(1)(a) (West Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 19.158.020(2)(a) (West
or (2) any "other communication" in which a prize or free gift is offered,
a return call is invited, and a sale is expected to be made during the
return call.' Florida and Washington, which employ a similar defini-
tion, also include "other communications" in which the seller "misrepre-
sents the price, quality, or availability of... goods" and invites a call by
the recipient.' Hence, the Florida and Washington definitions include
inbound programs that involve chance promotions as well as those in-
volving misrepresentations. However, these definitions still leave many
telemarketers unaffected by the statute.
The last group of statutes have very detailed definitions of
telemarketing. The definitions in these statutes take into account the
various fraudulent telemarketing scams discussed above and are de-
signed to stop such abuses. The definitions used by the California, Ore-
gon, and Rhode Island statutes are designed to protect the consumers
against illegal lotteries,' office supply scams,"' precious metal, gem,
or oil and gas scams, " ' and telemarketers "passing off" their goods as
manufactured by someone other than the actual telemarketer."2 In addi-
Supp. 1992).
207. IDAHO CODE § 48-1001(10)(b) (Supp. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.603(1)(b) (West Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(2)(b) (West
Supp. 1992).
208. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(2)(c) (West Supp. 1992); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 501.603(1)(c) (West Supp. 1992). "Other communication" is defined as
"written or oral notification or advertisement transmitted through any means." WASH.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 19.158.020(2)(d) (West Supp. 1992).
209. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992) (statute applies
to telemarketers who represent to prospective purchasers that they will receive a
prize or gift and encourages them to "purchase or rent . . . goods or services" or
"[play any money . . . including . . . a delivery or handling charge"); see also OR.
REV. STAT. § 646.551(1)(a)(A) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-61-2(h)(1)(B) (1987).
210. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-61-2(h)(1)(C) (1987) (the definition encompasses
telemarketers who imply "that a prospective purchaser who buys office equipment or
supplies will, because of some unusual event or imminent price increase, be able to
buy these items at prices which are below those that are usually charged"). Califor-
nia and Oregon statutes contain nearly identical provisions. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17511.1(a)(4) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.551(1)(a)(C) (1989).
211. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.551(1)(a)(F) (1989) ("telephonic seller" includes solicita-
tions in which "the items for sale are gold, silver or other precious metals, diamonds,
rubies, sapphires or other precious stones or any interest in oil, gas or mineral
fields"); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(a)(7) (West Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-61-2(h)(1)(F) (1992).
212. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-61-2(h)(1)(D) (1987) (seller represents to buyer that "seller
is a person other than the person he or she is") and 5-61-2(h)(1)(E) (1987) (seller
represents that "the items for sale are manufactured or supplied by a person other
than the actual manufacturer or supplier"); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17511.1(a)(5) & (6) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.551(1)(a)(D) & (E)
(1989).
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tion, California's statutory definition is designed to protect consumers
against scams involving loans,"3 credit cards,"4 and "any... invest-
ment opportunity of any type whatsoever."
215
California, Oregon, and Rhode Island all protect against both inbound
and outbound telemarketing programs. However, Rhode Island protects
only against inbound programs involving the sale of metals, gems, "or
any interest in oil, gas or mineral fields, wells, or exploration sites."
21
Since these statutes focus on the methods used by fraudulent
telemarketers, they are effective in reducing the more common types of
telemarketing fraud. However, telemarketers are adept at devising new
scams and, consequently, may find a way to circumvent the definitions in
the statues. Therefore, the most effective definition of telemarketing is
one that is sufficiently broad to include all telemarketers, such as the
definition used in the Utah statute1 7 and the two pending federal
bills."8 When all telemarketers are included under the provisions of a
statute, the law will be more effective because it will ensure that every-
one selling goods or services over the telephone will operate by the same
guidelines.
2. Exemptions
Although the statutes vary in their definition of telemarketing, each
law exempts certain types of telephonic sellers from complying with
particular provisions of the regulations, such as registration and bonding
requirements. 9 Some exemptions are common to most, if not all, the
statutes, ° while others are evidence of differing regional policy con-
213. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(a)(8) (West Supp. 1992).
214. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(a)(9) (West Supp. 1992).
215. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(a)(7) (West Supp. 1992). Although "invest-
ment" is not defined, the language appears broad enough to encompass any sales
presentation in which the salesperson represents to the potential customer that the
customer could see a return on his or her investment.
216. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-2(h)(2) (1987).
217. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
218. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 233-66 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(e)(7) (West Supp. 1992) (providing
exemption for sellers of "a newspaper of general circulation"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.604(6) (same).
cems.ni This section will discuss some of the more common exemp-
tions.
Because state legislators do not want to enact laws that will inhibit
open and robust commerce, telemarketing statutes are designed to dis-
courage only fraudulent telemarketing practices. Therefore, many of the
exemptions are designed to exempt businesses that do not make
telemarketing the primary focus of their sales efforts or that use
telemarketing only to follow up with existing customers.' Commonly,
the statutes exempt companies soliciting business from existing cus-
tomers,' companies soliciting service contracts from existing custom-
ers,22A and companies that employ telemarketing as a small portion of
their sales activities.2m
Certain businesses are also routinely given exemptions under state
law. Solicitations made by businesses in highly regulated industries such
as public utilities,"6 financial institutions, 7 and securities and futures
221. For example, the Nevada statute exempts persons "to whom a nonrestricted
gaming license has been issued." NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.020(l)(t) (1991). Also, the
Washington statute exempts persons "soliciting the sale of food fish or shellfish."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(v) (West Supp. 1992).
222. STONE & WYMAN, supra note 23, at 94. Most sales executives find that 809 of
their companies' sales come from 20% of their customers. Telemarketing, therefore,
can be an important device for many businesses to keep in touch with their best
customers. Id.
223. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(c) (West Supp. 1992) ("'[C]ommercial
telephone solicitor' does not include ... [a] person soliciting business solely from
purchasers who have previously purchased from the business."). See also ARK CODE
ANN. § 4-95-107(2) (1992); CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(e)(8) (West Supp. 1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.604(23) (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 48-1005(b) (Supp.
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-673(b) (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.020(u) (1991); OR.
REV. STAT. § 646.553(2)(h) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 5-61-2(i)(6); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-26-4(8) (Supp. 1992).
224. FLA STAT. ANN. § 501.604(13) (West Supp. 1992) ("The provisions of this part
do not apply to . . . [a] person who solicits contracts for the maintenance or repair
of goods previously purchased from the person making the solicitation . . . ."); see
a/so L . REV. STAT. § 816(3) (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.020(s) (1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-26-4(7) (Supp. 1992).
225. Utah, Washington, and Idaho exempt businesses that make less than 60% of
their sales through telemarketing. IDAHO CODE § 48-1005(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-26-4(11) (Supp. 1992); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(a)(ii)
(West Supp. 1992). In addition, several states exempt businesses in which telephonic
sales are "isolated transactions." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.604(1) (West Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 48-1005(a)(i) (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-4(10) (Supp. 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1992).
226. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(e)(14) (West Supp. 1992) ("'[Telephonic
seller' or 'seller' does not include . . . [a] person or an affiliate of a person whose
business is regulated by the [California] Public Utilities Commission."); see also ALAs-
KA STAT. § 45.63.080(12) (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-302(1)(k) (1993); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 599B.020(1)(f) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.553(2)(m) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS
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brokers are often exempted from state regulation.' These exemptions
are given because the existing regulations provide enough guidance to
the industry that additional telemarketing regulations are not necessary.
Most states exempt solicitations involving newspapers and magazines,229
telephone services,' and cable television."' Statutes also often ex-
empt charitable solicitations.
232
States' exemptions may pose problems for law enforcement because
they leave large gaps that could be exploited by fraudulent telemarketers.
Although some of the exemptions apply only to persons or companies
registered under federal or state law (e.g., securities brokers, utilities,
§ 5-61-2(i)(10) (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN.. § 13-26-4(2)(a) (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(o) (West Supp. 1992).
227. "Financial institutions" generally include commercial banks, savings and loans,
trust companies, and credit unions. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(e)(10)
(West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.604(8) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 599B.020(l)(k) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.553(2)0) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-
3(i)(8) (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-4(4) (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(k) (West Supp. 1992).
228. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17511.1(e)(16) & (18) (West Supp. 1992);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-302(1)(m) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.604(18) & (20) (West
Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 48-1005(h) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 599B.020(1)
& (r) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.553(2)(o) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-2(i)(12)
(Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.158.020(3)(q)-(r) (West Supp. 1992).
229. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(e)(7) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-1-302(1)(a) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.604(6) (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE
§ 48-1005(e) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.020(d) (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646.553(2)(f) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-3(i)(5) (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-26-4(2)(b) (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)j) (West Supp.
1992).
230. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(e)(17) (West Supp. 1992) ("'[Tlelephonic
seller' ... does not include ... [a] person soliciting exclusively the sale of
telephone answering services .... "); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.604(15) & (19)
(West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.020(q) •(1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646.553(2)1 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 3-264(5) (Supp. 1987).
231. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(e)(13) (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.604(10) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.553(2)(L) (1989); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-61-3(i)(9) (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(n) (West
Supp. 1992).
232. ALAsKA STAT. § 45.603.080(a) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.020(l)(e) (1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.553(2)(q) (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-4(2)(c) (Supp. 1992).
Florida and Washington exempt political, as well as charitable organizations. FLA.
REV. STAT. § 501.604(2) (West Supp. 1992) ("The provisions of this part do not apply
to: . . .A person making calls for religious, charitable, political, educational, or other
noncommercial purposes .... ); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.020(3)(b)
(West Supp. 1992).
cable television), other exemptions do not have the same limitations
(e.g., newspaper and magazine sales, charitable organizations). It would
not be difficult for an inventive boiler room operator to exploit these
exemptions by devising a scam involving exempted businesses or phony
charities. Therefore, an effective statute should not have many exemp-
tions. In fact, the only way to ensure that a telemarketing statute will
apply evenly to all telemarketers is to limit the number of vague and
broad exemptions.
3. Registration and Licensing
State telemarketing statutes often require telemarketers who do not
qualify for an exemptions to register with the state attorney general or
another state agency.' Statutes that include such registration require-
ments "can make it easier to trace the operators and also to bring crimi-
nal actions for misleading or dishonest disclosures." ' Under the regis-
tration provisions, all telemarketers who wish to do business' in a par-
ticular state must provide the state with certain information and a filing
fee. 7 Failure to register under a state registration statute subjects the
telemarketer to criminal as well as civil penalties.'
As discussed above, recidivism is a major problem facing state at-
tempts at combatting telemarketing fraud. 9 Therefore, registration stat-
utes generally require the telemarketer to provide information regarding
any past criminal or fraudulent activities of all employees of the
233. Under most statutes, the telemarketer bears the burden of proving that he or
she is entitled to an exemption. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1(f) (West
Supp. 1992) ("[T]he burden of proving an exemption or an exception from a defini-
tion is on the person claiming it . . . ."); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 646.555 (1989).
234. See,. e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.3(a) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring
registration with Consumer Law Section of the California Department of Justice);
IDAHO CODE § 48-1004(a) (Supp. 1992) (requiring registration with the state attorney
general).
235. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 133.
236. "'Doing business' in [a] state includes both commercial telephone solicitation
from a location in [the state] and solicitation of purchasers located in [the state]."
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.050(1) (West Supp. 1992); see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 501.605(1) (West Supp. 1992).
237. CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 17511.3(a) (West Supp. 1992) ($50.00 filing fee); OR.
REV. STAT. § 646.553(2) (1989) ($400.00 filing fee); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.606(5)(b)
(West Supp. 1992) ($1,500.00 filing fee).
238. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.060 (West Supp. 1992) (failure to register con-
stitutes a misdemeanor); F[A. STAT. ANN. § 501.623(1) (failure to register with the
state of Florida is a felony of the third degree). California law provides for fines of
up to $10,000 per transaction and imprisonment of up to one year. CAL Bus. '&
PROF. CODE § 17511.9 (West Supp. 1992).
239. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
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telemarketing firm, including violation of state telemarketing laws. '
Past criminal or fraudulent activities are grounds for denial of a license
or refusal to renew an existing license."4 Also, falsification of informa-
tion on the licensing application is grounds for denying or revoking a
license."u
Registration statutes often require the telemarketer to supply informa-
tion regarding the type of solicitation the telemarketer will be operat-
ing.' This allows state officials to monitor the types of telemarketing
programs being run in their state. Most statutes require telemarketers to
file scripts used in the sales presentation, as well as information regard-
ing the products and the prices paid by the telemarketer for the prod-
ucts.'" If the telemarketer is operating a chance promotion, some stat-
utes require that the telemarketer supply information regarding the value
of the prizes offered and the odds of winning each prize.245
Telemarketers who offer investments and make representations regarding
the potential of the investments are required to provide information to
substantiate the claims. 6 Finally, telemarketers who are selling office
240. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.4(h) (West Supp. 1992) (requesting a
"statement . . . as to ... whether ... [any principal or employee] has been con-
victed of a felony or misdemeanor involving an alleged violation of this article, or
fraud, theft, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of property.");
see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-614(h)(1) (Supp. 1987).
241. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.612(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992).
242. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.612(g) (West Supp. 1992).
243. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.605(2) (West Supp. 1992); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE 88 17511.4a)-(k) (West Supp. 1992).
244. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17511.4(j)-(k) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring "descrip-
tion of the items the seller is offering . . . a copy of all sales scripts . . . [and] a
copy of all sales information and literature"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.605(2) (West
Supp. 1992) ("The application shall be accompanied by a copy of any: Script, out-
line . . . sales information or literature to be provided by the applicant to a salesper-
son . . . and . . . to a purchaser . . ").
245. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.40) (West Supp. 1992). The California statute
requires telemarketers to provide: A list of the prizes, the value of each prize, the
price paid by the telemarketer for each prize, the manner in which a winner is de-
termined, the odds of winning each prize, the names and addresses of each winner
of the prize with the highest value, and all rules, regulations, terms and conditions.
Id.; see also R.I GEN. LAws § 5-614(1) (Supp. 1987).
246. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §8 17511.5(b)(2), 17511.4(m)(5) (West Supp. 1992). The
California statute provides: "If the seller makes any representations as to the earning
or profit potential of purchases of any metal, stone, or mineral, the [seller shall dis-
close to the purchaser, all] data to substantiate the claims made." Id.; see also R.I.
GEN. LAws 8 5-61-4(m)(5) (Supp. 1987). California and Rhode Island also require simi-
lar information for telemarketers offering investments in oil and gas interests. See
supplies must disclose the names and addresses of the manufacturers
and suppliers of all products offered.247
Several states also require all telemarketers, as part of the registration
process, to appoint the attorney general or another state authority as the
telemarketer's agent for service of process in the state. 8 This require-
ment makes it easier for citizens to sue fraudulent telemarketers without
having to go to the expense and effort of locating the telemarketer who,
often, has been placing the phone calls from another state or who has
left the state in which the victim resides.
Registration statutes benefit state officials in several ways. The disclo-
sure of past criminal and fraudulent acts enables states to deny access to
telemarketers likely to defraud citizens.24 Also, the information re-
garding the types of programs being offered by telemarketers allows
states to deny licenses to telemarketers operating schemes likely to mis-
lead or deceive.'s However, the registration statutes do nothing to help
citizens swindled by boiler room operators who have avoided apprehen-
sion by state officials. For this reason, many states have enacted statutes
requiring telemarketers to post surety bonds to reimburse customers for
their losses. Bonding requirements are discussed in greater detail below.
4. Bonding
Several states require telemarketers doing business in the state to post
a bond from a surety company, an irrevocable letter of credit from a
federally insured bank, or a certificate of deposit from a federally insured
financial institution." The bond, typically for $50,000,"2 provides secu-
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.4(n)(5) (West Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-
4(n)(4) (Supp. 1987).
247. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.5(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.605(4)(b) (West 1989).
248. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.070 (West Supp. 1992) ("Each commercial tele-
phone solicitor shall appoint the director of the department of licensing as an agent
to receive civil process . . . ."); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.6 (West
1987) (requiring filing of an irrevocable consent appointing the attorney general agent
for service of process).
249. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.612(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that officials can deny
a license to a telemarketer who has been convicted of fraud, theft, embezzlement, "or
any other crime involving moral turpitude").
250. See IDAHO CODE § 48-1001(2) (Supp. 1992) (stating that the intent of the legis-
lature is to "prohibit representations that have the capacity, tendency, or effect of
misleading a purchaser").
251. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.611(1)(C) (West Supp. 1992) (allowing
telemarketers to post either a bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit "which
may be withdrawn only on the order of the [Florida Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services]"); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.100(1) (1989) (same). California
requires a bond of all telemarketers. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.12(a) (West
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rity for consumers who sue and obtain judgments against fraudulent
telemarketers. The statutes generally contain language requiring that the
bond be "in favor of the [s]tate for the benefit of any person suffering in-
jury or loss by reason of any violation of this chapter."' The victim or
any government agency, including the state, can bring a lawsuit against a
telemarketer to recover on the bond.' In addition to the general bond,
California also requires a second bond from telemarketers operating
chance promotions. Such a prize bond must cover the current market
value of all prizes being offered.2"
Bonding requirements also reduce the number of telemarketing scams
operating in the state by discouraging fraudulent telemarketers from
opening boiler rooms.25 To avoid posting the bond, fraudulent
telemarketers will operate in states that do not have bonding require-
ments or operate without being bonded. 7 However, if telemarketers
operate unbonded in a state with a bonding requirement, they are subject
to criminal and civil penalties. In addition, bonding companies require
financial statements and collateral before issuing a bond. Such require-
ments reduce the number of fraudulent telemarketers operating in a state
with a bonding requirement.2" Therefore, states that have enacted
bonding requirements have generally experienced a decrease in the num-
ber of fraudulent telemarketing scams operating in the state.'s In addi-
Supp. 1992).
252. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.12(a) (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.611(2) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.100(2) (1991). But see LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:813(3) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring $10,000 or a letter of cred-
it).
253. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.12(a) (West Supp. 1992).
254. See FLA- STAT. ANN. § 501.611(4) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. STAT. ANN.
§ 599B.100(3) (1991).
255. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.12(b) (West Supp. 1992) ("The proceeds of
the [prize] bond shall be paid to any person suffering injury or loss by reason of any
violation of this chapter .... The bond shall be maintained until the seller files
with the Attorney General proof that the premium [prize] was awarded.").
256. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 133. Nevada's bond-
ing requirement "helped drive most of the telemarketers to other nearby States." Id.
Arizona found that their telemarketing bond requirement "substantially reduced the
number of Arizona boiler rooms in operation." Id. at 134.
257. Id. at 133.
258. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54. While the collateral and financial
statement requirements help to keep fraudulent telemarketers out of the state, the
requirements also make it difficult for small legitimate telemarketers, who may not
have substantial collateral or strong financial statements, to stay in business. Id.
259. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 133-34. However,
tion, legitimate telemarketers favor the bonding requirements, saying that
they would "gladly pay the bond to 'weed out those bad apples.'"'
Generally, however, statutes set the amount of the bond too low to
effectively compensate the victims of a large boiler room operation.
Some boiler rooms gross as much as one to three-million dollars per
week.2"' Thus, in the event that the boiler room is bonded and consum-
ers win judgments against the bond, $50,000 will not satisfy the judg-
ments. In addition, since the premium for a bond is usually low,' the
loss of that amount would not seriously impair a fraudulent
telemarketer's ability to simply move to another state and post another
bond.2"
State bonding requirements are also troublesome for legitimate
telemarketers. A single telemarketer who wishes to do business na-
tionwide must register and post bond in several states. The price of nu-
merous bonds can sometimes be prohibitive to small legitimate
telemarketers.'
Although bonding requirements may be flawed, in most cases the flaws
are not fatal and can be remedied.2' One of the major goals of the state
statutory schemes is to inform consumers about the telemarketers and
their products so that consumers can make an informed purchase.2" By
requiring telemarketers to make certain disclosures, the statutes decrease
some of the problems associated with the bonds because fewer consum-
ers will be duped into buying products and trying to recover from the
bonds.
California found that registration and bonding laws do not work unless they are strin-
gently enforced. The state must follow through and prosecute violations of the laws
to send a message to fraudulent telemarketers. The California securities enforcement
chief testified before a House subcommittee that "if you don't follow up and if you
don't coordinate efforts and if you don't track complaints . . . [the law] doesn't do
anything." Id. at 133 n.326.
260. Id. at 134.
261. Id. at 135.
262. Bond premiums are generally only about 1096 of the total bond amount. Inter-
view with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54.
263. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKEnING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 134-35.
264. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54.
265. See infra notes 374-76 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511(b) (West Supp. 1992) ("It is the
intent of the Legislature in enacting this article to . . . provide each prospective tele-
phonic sales purchaser with information necessary to make an intelligent decision
regarding the offer made . . ").
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5. Disclosures
Most telemarketing statutes require that the telemarketer disclose
certain information to all potential customers. 7 A broad goal of the
telemarketing statutes is to eliminate consumer confusion and avoid mis-
representation by fraudulent telemarketers.. Disclosure requirements
accomplish this goal by ensuring that the customer receives all pertinent
information he might need to locate a telemarketer who defrauds him.
The disclosure provisions generally require that telemarketers provide
potential customers with preliminary information that will enable the
customer to make an informed decision about whether to listen to the
sales presentation. Most of the statutes require that, within a specified
time," a telemarketer must clearly state to a potential purchaser the
telemarketer's identity, business address, and the nature of the telephone
call.27 Some statutes further specify that the telemarketer must supply
the potential customer with the telemarketer's registration number.27 '
After giving the purchaser this preliminary information, the telemarketer
267. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.5 (West 1987); FLL STAT. ANN.
§ 501.613 (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 48-1004(c)-(f) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 599B.170, 599B.180(2), 599B.190(4) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.557 (1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-6 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.158.110(1),
19.158.110(4)-(6) (West Supp. 1992).
268. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511(b) (West 1987); IDAHO CODE § 48-1001(2)
(Supp. 1992).
269. The telemarketer usually must make the disclosure immediately upon making
contact with the potential purchaser. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.613(1) (West Supp.
1992) (requiring disclosure within the first 30 seconds of the telephone call); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-26-6(1) (Supp. 1992) (disclosure "within 15 seconds of making con-
tact with the party called"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.110(1) (West Supp. 1992)
(disclosure within first minute of call). But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.5
(West 1987) (requiring the disclosure be made "at the time the solicitation is made
and prior to consummation of any sales transaction").
270. FL4 STAT. ANN. § 501.613(1) (West Supp. 1992). "[A] commercial telephone sell-
er ...shall identify himself by stating his true name, the company on whose behalf
the solicitation is being made, and the consumer goods or services being sold." Id.;
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-6(1) (Supp. 1992) ("A telephone solicitor . . . shall
identify the business initiating the call and provide a summary statement of what the
call is about . . . ."); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.110(1) (West Supp. 1992)
(stating that the telephone solicitor shall "[ijdentfy himself or herself, the company
on whose behalf the solicitation is being made, [and] the property, goods, or services
being sold").
271. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 48-1004(c) (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.158.110(5) (West Supp. 1992).
must terminate the phone call if the purchaser indicates an unwillingness
to continue the conversation.272
Several statutory schemes require that the telemarketer make special
disclosures when offering a chance promotion. A telemarketer running a
chance promotion must disclose to the potential purchaser the prelimi-
nary information discussed above as well as the following: (1) a descrip-
tion of the prizes;2 3 (2) the value of the prizes; (3) the terms and
conditions of the promotion;276 (4) the odds of winning each prize;276
and (5) the total number (and, under some statutes, name and address)
of people who have won the highest value prize within the past year.'
7
State telemarketing statutes often provide that any sale made over the
telephone will not be final unless the telemarketer sends the purchaser a
written confirmation of the order.278 Many states, therefore, require that
telemarketers send written confirmation of a sale to the purchaser within
a specified period of time. The written confirmation fulfills two re-
quirements. First, the confirmation advises the customer of the name, ad-
dress, and phone number of the telemarketer.' Second, the written
confirmation advises customers of their right to cancel the contract and
receive a refund of all monies paid.28 Several statutes provide
272. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19.158.110(l)(b) (West Supp. 1992).
273. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.614(1) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 599B.180(1)(a) (1991).
274. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.614(2) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 599B.180(1)(b) (1991).
275. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17511.5(a)(1), 17511,4(1)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.614(3) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599.180(B)(1)(c)
(1991).
276. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17511.5(a)(1), 17511.4(l)(B) (West Supp. 1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 501.614(4), (5)(b) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599.180(B)(1)(d)
& (e)(2) (1991).
277. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.5(a)(3) (West Supp. 1992); FLA_ STAT. ANN.
§ 501.614(5)(c) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 599.180(B)(e)(3) (1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 646.557(c) (1991).
278. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-5(3) (Supp. 1992)
279. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 599B.190(4) (1987) ("Within 3 days after any pur-
chase of goods or services or upon delivery of the goods or services, whichever is
later, the seller shall provide the purchaser with a written summary" of the
purchaser's right to cancel the sale); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.615(3) (West
Supp. 1993).
280. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-5(3)(a) (1992). Although most telemarketing
statutes require telemarketers to give this information orally to the customer as well,
it is well recognized that many people do not bother to write such information down.
See THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 5 (stating that elderly
people "rarely memorialize phone conversations").
281. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.615(3) (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 48-1004(2)
(Supp. 1992); NEV REV. CODE § 599B.190(4) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-5(3)(b)
(1992); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.120(1) (West Supp. 1992).
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telemarketers with disclaimer notices that the telemarketers must reprint
verbatim.'
In addition to providing consumers with needed information and pro-
tecting the consumers' interests in the event that they are defrauded,
state statutes also serve to discourage potential fraudulent telemarketers
from opening boiler rooms by providing substantial penalties for viola-
tion of the telemarketing statutes.
6. Penalties/Remedies
State telemarketing statutes provide state authorities with several dif-
ferent remedies. As discussed above, state law provides penalties for
telemarketers operating a telemarketing business without the proper
registration.' However, in addition to penalties for non-registration, the
statutes also provide civil and criminal penalties for each violation of the
particular telemarketing statute, such as failure to make specified disclo-
sures or use of deceptive practices.' Also, some statutes provide for
attorneys' fees.'
Telemarketing statutes also empower state authorities to seek declara-
tory judgments and injunctive relief on behalf of victims of telemarketing
scams." However, as discussed above, declaratory actions and in-
junctions are often ineffective in shutting down illegal telemarketing
operations." ' The statutes, however, make it clear that the remedies
282. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-26-5(3)(b) (1992). The Utah disclosure provides
as follows:
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION
You, the buyer, may cancel this order without any penalty or obligation
within three business days from the delivery of the merchandise or premium
(gift, bonus, prize, or award), whichever is delivered later.
Id.
283. See supra note 236-38 and accompanying text.
284. California, Florida, and Rhode Island provide civil penalties of $10,000 per vio-
lation of their respective statutes. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.9(a) (West 1987);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.619 (West Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-61-5(A) (1987). In
addition, California and Rhode Island provide for imprisonment of up to one year.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.9(b) (West 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-5(B) (1987).
Nevada provides a $25,000 fine and up to 6 years imprisonment. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 599B.250(1) (1987).
285. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.621 (West Supp. 1992).
286. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.618 (West Supp. 1992) (declaratory judgment and in-
junction); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.158.090 (West Supp. 1992) (same).
287. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
listed are not exclusive and that fraudulent telemarketers can be prose-
cuted under any other applicable theory.'
Although state telemarketing statutes have had some success in com-
batting telemarketing fraud, states will never be able to effectively curtail
the growth of telemarketing fraud and the consequent damage to the
economy because of their limited resources and jurisdictions.' State
telemarketing statutes have led to some arrests and convictions, but they
have failed to reduce the total number of telemarketing frauds being
perpetrated nationwide. To combat telemarketing fraud on a national
level, federal legislation must be enacted giving the Federal Trade Com-
mission and state attorneys general the power to regulate the
telemarketing industry and shut down boiler room operations.' °
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have realized the
necessity for action at the federal level, and both bodies have introduced
legislation to combat telemarketing fraud. Between 1987 and 1991, sever-
al telemarketing bills were introduced in Congress, although none of
them were enacted." In 1991, the Consumer Protection Telemarketing
288. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.10 (West 1987) ("The[se] reme-
dies . . . shall be in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation
or conduct provided for in any other law.").
289. Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 95 (statement of Carole Byrum, Investigations
Officer, U.S. Bank of Oregon) (discussing the ineffective attempts by state officials to
combat telemarketing fraud and stressing the need for federal statutes criminalizing
telemarketing fraud, credit card factoring, and debit drafts, and "heavy" financial pen-
alties and prison sentences).
290. David R. Spiegel, Foiling Phone Robbers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 14.
"[S]ince telemarketing fraud is a national problem, it is imperative that it be ad-
dressed through federal legislation rather than piecemeal by state legislatures, as it
has been up to now." Id.
291. H.R. REP. No. 781, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988). On July 27 and December 3,
1987, the House Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials
of the Committee on Energy and Commerce held hearings on telemarketing fraud. Id.
These hearings resulted in a determination by the Subcommittee that the scope of
telemarketing fraud was too large to rely on enforcement by the FTC under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1991), and by the states. Id.
at 6.
On March 6, 1988, the House introduced the Telemarketing and Fraud Prevention
Act of 1988, H.R. 4101, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). The bill required the FTC to
promulgate rules governing telemarketing, authorized state attorneys general and con-
sumers to sue in federal court to enforce the FTC rules, prohibited harassment over
the phone, and established an FTC "clearinghouse" for inquiries about telemarketing.
See generally Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4101
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the
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Act was introduced in the House' and the Telemarketing and Consum-
er Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act was introduced in the Senate.' By
the adjournment of Congress at the end of 1992, the two bills had been
amended so that they were nearly identical and both were close to enact-
ment.' The current Congress has recently revived the bills which may
be passed in the current session. 5 However, as of the writing of this
Comment, the two bills differ significantly. This section will detail the
major provisions and significant differences of the two bills.
A. Consumer Protection Telemarketing Act
The purpose of the Consumer Protection Telemarketing Act is to
"strengthen the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to protect
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). In March
1989, the House introduced the Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1989, H.R.
1354, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), which contained the essential features of the prior
bill, with a few additions. See generally Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1989:
Hearing on 1354 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
In April 1988, the Senate introduced a bill, the Consumer Fraud Prevention Act,
S. 2326, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), which was based, in part, on the House
Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act. A later bill, the Telemarketing and Consumer
Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, S. 2494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), introduced by
the Senate on April 23, 1990, was also similar to the House bill, but it extended the
subpoena power of the FTC and permitted court-ordered production of financial re-
cords without notice, "if the court [found] that the party [was] likely to transfer as-
sets to avoid seizure." S. REP. No. 396, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
292. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
293. S. 1392, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
294. The Senate passed the compromise bill, but it was never considered by the full
House. 1993 Daily Report for Executives (BNA) 14 d65, Jan. 25, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library.
295. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, H.R. 868, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); David R. Spiegel, Foiling Phone Robbers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16,
1992, at 13. The bill was cleared by the Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazard-
ous Materials of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on February 18, 1993.
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1602, at 164 (Feb. 18, 1993). By August 1993,
both bills had passed their respective chambers and were awaiting reconciliation by a
joint committee. Senate OKIs Bill to Combat Fraud in Telemarketing, TRAVEL WEEK-
LY, Aug. 9, 1993, at 3. See also Senator Blasts Telemarketing Fraud, DM NEWS, Mar.
22, 1993, at 88 (Senator Bryan stated that "Congress needs to pass [telemarketing]
legislation this year").
Because the bills introduced in the 103d Congress are identical in nearly all re-
spects to earlier versions of the bills, all cites in this section will be to the bill as it
stood at the end of the 102d Congress.
consumers in connection with sales made with a telephone."' The bill
defines telemarketing as "a plan, program, or campaign which is conduct-
ed to induce purchases of goods or services by significant use of one or
more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone
call."' The statute's only exemption is for solicitations of sales through
the mailing of a catalog. To qualify for the exemption, the telemarketer
must show that the catalog (1) contains illustrations or written descrip-
tions of the goods being offered; (2) includes the business address of the
seller; (3) contains multiple pages of written material; and (4) is pro-
duced at least once a year and used in solicitations in which the purchas-
er rather than the seller makes the first call.' Thus, the House bill's
definition of telemarketing is much broader than the definitions in most
of the state statutes discussed above.' Under the House bill, nearly all
businesses using the phone to solicit sales would have to comply with
federal telemarketing regulations.
The House bill requires that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
"prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive (including fraudulent)
telemarketing activities and other abusive telemarketing activities" within
270 days after the bill's enactment." The FTC's rules, in turn, must in-
clude a definition of deceptive telemarketing activities and list "criteria
that are symptomatic" of deceptive telemarketing and that differ from le-
gitimate telemarketing practices."I The identification of criteria that dis-
tinguish deceptive telemarketing is "necessary to provide 'bright line'
guidance to consumers, enforcement officers, and telemarketers as to
what patterns of behavior may be considered to be examples of decep-
tive telemarketing activity. " 2
The FTC's rules must also prohibit telemarketers from placing unsolic-
ited calls that "the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or
abusive of such consumer's right to privacy"' and restrict the hours
during which telemarketers can place phone calls.' 4. The bill instructs
296. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
297. Id. § 8(4).
298. Id. The catalog exemption allows national catalog sellers such as Sears Roe-
buck, JC Penney, and Lands' End to operate without interference from the federal
statutes.
299. See supra notes 202-16, and accompanying text.
300. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(1) (1992). The rules would be issued
under § 5 of the FrCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1991), which prohibits unfair or deceptive
acts or practices. Id.
301. Id. § 3(a)(2).
302. H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 10 (1992).
303. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong, 2d Sess. § 3(a)(3) (1992). The rule should include pro-
scriptions on such inappropriate practices as "threats or intimidation, obscene or
profane language, refusal to identify the calling party, [and] continuous or repeated
ringing of the telephone." H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 11.
304. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(3) (1992). The bill does not suggest the
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the FTC that while promulgating the telemarketing rules, it should also
"consider" adopting two additional requirements. First, the FTC should
consider a rule requiring that goods and services be delivered or provid-
ed within a specified period of time or a refund provided to the consum-
er.' Second, the Commission should consider a rule granting consum-
ers the authority to cancel the order within a specified period."
In its most important provision, the bill gives state attorneys general
the power to "bring a civil action on behalf of its residents in an appro-
priate district court of the United States. ",°7 In the federal suit, a state
attorney general can seek injunctions against fraudulent telemarketers
who violate the FTC rules, enforce compliance with the FTC rules, and
"obtain damages, restitution, or other compensation... or... other
relief as the court may deem appropriate."" Under this provision, state
attorneys general can obtain injunctions against boiler room operators
that would apply nationwide. This authority greatly increases the power
of state officials" and enables them to halt fraudulent telemarketers'
operations in all fifty states.
310
Before state attorneys general file any action against a boiler room
operator, they must give notice to the FTC."' State attorneys general
are precluded from bringing the action against the telemarketer if the
FTC is already prosecuting or investigating the same telemarketer. 3
This rule prevents duplication of effort by federal and state officials,
promotes efficiency, and avoids subjecting defendants to multiple related
actions simultaneously. 33
hours the FrC should allow telemarketing to take place.
305. Id. § 3(a)(3)(A).
306. Id. § 3(a)(3)(B). This rule could be constructed similar to the rules requiring
disclosure of consumers' cancellation rights enacted by many states. See supra notes
278-79 and accompanying text.
307. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1992).
308. Id.
309. S. REP. No. 80, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 'at 11 (1993). In addition to injunctions,
state officials can seek "orders enforcing compliance with any rule, regulation, or
order of the FrC under this legislation .... " Id. at 10.
310. Id. at 11. In addition, the bill does not eliminate the rights of state attorneys
general and other state officials to bring actions in state courts to enforce state lAws.
H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(c) & (e)(2) (1991).
311. Id. § 4(b).
312. Id. § 4(d).
313. H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 '(1992).
The bill also allows private persons "who have been adversely affected
by any pattern or practice of telemarketing" that violates the FTC rules,
to bring an action in an appropriate United States district court to enjoin
the telemarketer, enforce the FTC rules, or obtain damages."4 Private
persons, like state attorneys general, must give the FTC prior notice of
the filing of the action and cannot file an action if the FTC is already
suing the telemarketer."5 While this provision would appear to give pri-
vate persons a powerful weapon by allowing them to seek federal injunc-
tions, its use is limited to persons who have been damaged in excess of
$50,000. 3"' This high threshold excludes the vast majority of victims of
telemarketing fraud who typically lose only a few hundred dollars."'7
Although victims with low dollar losses could not bring actions in federal
court, they are not completely without legal recourse because the bill
does not "restrict any right which any person may have under any statute
or common law.""' However, state civil suits, as discussed above, have
been relatively ineffective in combatting telemarketing fraud.
314. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (1992). The bill also provides that the
court may award attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing party. Id. at § 5(d).
Some commentators have suggested that individuals can prosecute fraudulent
telemarketers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO),
18 U.S.C. 88 1961-1968 (1990). See also Ellen M. Faro, Note, Telemarketing Credit
Card Fraud: Is RICO One Answer?, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 675. Ms. Faro concludes
that "application of civil RICO to telemarketing credit card fraud is a viable use of
the RICO statute." Id. at 677. However, she points out that a RICO suit would be
difficult to win because the plaintiff would have to satisfy the "strict pleading require-
ments" of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and provide specific
details of the operation of the fraud, such as the times the calls were placed and the
location and identity of the caller. Id. at 704. She also asserts that plaintiffs would
have a difficult time suing corporations under RICO because the statute would re-
quire the plaintiff to name a "person" in addition to naming the "enterprise." Id. at
698-700, 705-06. Finally, she argues for a liberal application of RICO to telemarketing
fraud so that individuals could sue fraudulent telemarketers without meeting the tech-
nicalities of the law. Id. at 706-10.
The pending telemarketing legislation would not be hindered by such problems.
Since the statute requires the FrC to enact guidelines that would target fraudulent
telemarketing directly, the laws would be better suited to eliminating telemarketing.
Rather than altering or liberalizing the .application of an existing statute, a new stat-
ute should be enacted that would result in a better fit between the crime and the
remedy.
315. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(b) & (c) (1992).
316. Id.
317. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 15 (testimony of
California Deputy Attorney General Jerry Smilowitz). "The typical dollar loss on
[telemarketing scams] is usually no more than $400, but to many ... complain-
ants . . . the loss of $400 is oftentimes very significant." Id.
318. H.R. 3203, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(e) (1991).
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Under the House bill, the FTc also must "establish a clearinghouse for
inquiries made to Federal agencies concerning telemarketing""' that
would serve as a central repository of information on fraudulent
telemarketers nationwide."0 The clearinghouse would provide the infor-
mation it collects to law-enforcement officials or citizens who make
inquiries regarding any telemarketer.uI In this way, government would
be aided in its attempts to combat telemarketing fraud because the clear-
inghouse would (1) inform federal and state agencies of the existence of
investigations by other agencies; (2) prevent duplicative investigations;
(3) encourage the use of limited resources more efficiently; (4) help fed-
eral and state officials identify recidivists; and (5) aid in the referral of
certain types of telemarketing fraud cases to the appropriate investigato-
ry agency.' The clearinghouse would also aid the public by serving as
a "watchdog" to oversee the telemarketing industry in general and ensure
that telemarketers are not engaging in fraudulent practices."n
In late 1992, the House dropped the clearinghouse provision from the
bill due to concerns from the FTC over the cost and burden of imple-
menting the system.14 The Senate bill, discussed below, originally con-
tained a similar clearinghouse provision which was eliminated in later
drafts of the bill for the same reasons.
319. Id. § 6(a).
320. Robert W. Stewart, Phone Swindlers Net $15 Billion a Year; Crime: Victims
of Telemarketing Scams Are Usually the Elderly. A Congressional Report Blames
Unfocused Law Etforcement Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, at A5 (stating that
"[olne of the most serious roadblocks to better enforcement is the federal
government's failure to establish a central clearinghouse for law enforcement informa-
tion").
321. H.R. 3203, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(a) (1991). Although the FTC currently
provides information regarding investigations of telemarketing fraud, other agencies
have refused to participate. A federal clearinghouse would remedy this situation and
make information more readily available. See id.
322. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 36.
323. Larry Riggs, Consumers League Starts Tele-Fraud Clearinghouse, DM NEWS,
Jan. 27, 1992, at 1. The National Consumers League determined that a national data-
base was the best way to aid consumers by providing them with information regard-
ing telemarketers. Id.
324. Senate Passes Conference Vehicle on Telemarketing Fraud Prevention, 63 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1586, at 475 (Oct. 15, 1992).
B. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
The Senate bill is nearly identical to the House bill in most significant
respects. However, the Senate bill adds certain provisions not contained
in the House bill that substantially change the nature of the bill.
The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,
like the House bill, requires the FTC to promulgate rules related to
telemarketing fraud, including a definition of "deceptive telemarketing,"
and "consider" rules prohibiting calls during certain hours and giving
consumers a right to cancel orders made over the phone.' In addition,
the Senate bill requires the FTC to consider enacting "recordkeeping re-
quirements."26 The bill does not elaborate on what is meant by
"recordkeeping requirements." However, at a hearing on an earlier ver-
sion of a similar bill, Rep. Thomas A. Luken stated that if "the seller does
not keep records adequate to demonstrate compliance with [the] rules,
he is presumed to be in violation of the rule."3"7 Therefore,
recordkeeping requirements shift the burden of proof to the telemarketer
to demonstrate compliance with the rules to escape the presumption of a-
violation.
The Senate bill also gives rule-making power to federal agencies other
than the FTC. Under the Senate bill, no later than six months after the
effective date of the FTC's telemarketing rules, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTc) must promulgate rules "substantially similar" to the
FTC's rules regulating telemarketing by people and entities regulated by
either commission.' Neither the SEC nor the CFTC must promulgate
such rules, however, if either commission determines that existing laws
provide enough protection or that "such a rule ... is not necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, or for the protection of customers. " "
This provision of the Senate bill appears to be superfluous. Because the
bill defines telemarketing broadly and makes virtually no exemptions, the
FTC rules would apply to all telemarketers, including securities brokers
and futures traders. Further, rules established by the CFTC and SEC may
prove to be duplicative because members of these highly regulated indus-
tries must already comply with extensive disclosure rules."
325. S. 1392, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., § 3(a)(2) & (3) (1992).
326. Id. § 3(a)(3)(C).
327. Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4104 Before
the Subcomm. on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Thomas A. Luken).
328. S. 1392, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(d) & (e) (1992).
329. Id.
330. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54.
[VoL 21: 553, 19941 Telemarketing Fraud
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The Senate bill also gives the FTC authority to demand any person
under investigation for deceptive telemarketing practices to "produce
physical evidence for inspection, to give oral testimony in combination
with documentary material, answers, or testimony"3" pursuant to sec-
tion 20(c)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' The person re-
ceiving the demand must produce the physical evidence "under sworn
certificate, in such form as the demand designates."' However, the in-
vestigative authority granted the FTC under this provision simply reiter-
ates the powers the Commission already enjoys under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.' Although seemingly superfluous, the provision does
clarify that the powers of the FTC are not inhibited in any way by the
telemarketing bill.
The two federal bills will be very effective in accomplishing many of
the broad goals of law enforcement to combat telemarketing fraud. How-
ever, the bills alone will not end the problem. Only by accompanying the
bills with effective FTC rules, further statutes, and broad-based educa-
tional efforts can telemarketing fraud be eliminated.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FTC RULES, FURTHER LEGISLATIVE
ENACTMENTS, AND OTHER PROGRAMS
The statutory scheme proposed by Congress in the two telemarketing
bills addresses several of the most serious problems encountered by
states in combatting telemarketing fraud. First, the definition of
telemarketing applied by Congress is justifiably broad.' A broad defini-
tion is necessary in a federal telemarketing statute because many of the
state statutes contain numerous exemptions and loopholes for cunning
telemarketers to exploit. Only by broadly defining telemarketing can law
331. S. 1392, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(b) (1992).
332. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(c)(1) (1988). The section provides: "Whenever the Commis-
sion has reason to believe that any person may be in possession . . . of any docu-
mentary material, or may have any information relevant to unfair or deceptive prac-
tices . . . the Commission may ... issue . .. a civil investigative demand requiring
such person to produce such documentary material .... " Id.
333. S. 1392 at § 7(d) (1992).
334. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57(b)-1(c)(1) (1988) with S. 1392, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 7(d) (1992).
335. See S. 1392, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4) (1991); H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8(4) (1991).
enforcement officials ensure that all telemarketers, legitimate and fraudu-
lent, will play by the same rules.'
Second, giving state attorneys general the power to bring cases against
fraudulent telemarketers in federal courts' alleviates the most signif-
icant problem facing state law enforcement officials in battling boiler
room operations. As discussed above, fraudulent telemarketers faced
with a state court injunction generally stop selling in the state granting
the injunction and concentrate on other states.'a This pattern has sig-
nificantly hampered state officials' efforts to combat telemarketing fraud
because, although state officials can often shut down a boiler room's
operations in their state, the boiler room will continue to defraud
thousands of people in other states. Under the legislation proposed by
Congress, state officials will be able to completely close down boiler
room operations nationwide.'
Third, requiring the FTC to promulgate rules proscribing abusive and
fraudulent telemarketing practices,"4 including the placing of calls dur-
ing certain hours, serves the important goal of reducing calls that many
consider annoying34 ' or an invasion of privacy.34 Legitimate
336. See Hearing on S. 2213, H.R. 4104, and S. 2326, supra note 15, at 72. Some
business groups, however, contend that a broad definition will inhibit businesses that
are not intended to be the focus of the bill. The National Retail Merchants Associa-
tion (NRMA) commented on an earlier bill, H.R. 4101, with a similar telemarketing
definition. The NRMA stated that "virtually all business transactions which involve the
use of a telephone as a sales tool, and all related advertising and marketing practices
could be covered by the bill's definition." Id.
337. See S. 1392, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b) (1991); H.R. 3203, 102 Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4 (1991).
338. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
339. See Hearing on . 2213, H.R. 4104, and S. 2326, supra note 15, at 91. The
DMA has strongly opposed provisions in previous bills giving state officials the power
to seek federal injunctions against fraudulent telemarketing. The DMA has stated that
giving state attorneys general this power would be "like riding in a car that has no
seat belts" and would subject telemarketers to the whims of state officials who
would "have the power to give nationwide effect to their views on what is
fraudulent." Id. The DMA's concerns are well placed; however, the federal law, in
practice, may eliminate those concerns. Pursuant to the bill, the FTC must also de-
vise criteria that are symptomatic of fraudulent telemarketing. S. 1392, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 3(a)(2) (1992). To bring actions under the federal telemarketing statute, state
officials will have to show violations of the FTC rules. Courts construing the federal
bill will, therefore, apply the FrC's views and not state officials' views on what is
fraudulent.
340. See S. 1392, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1992); H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., § 3(a) (1992).
341. See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the
Right of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99, 100 n.8 (1986) (in a survey conducted by Pa-
cific Telephone, 86.9% of respondents indicated that they found unsolicited sales calls
annoying).
342. Id. at 100 (25.1% of respondents to the Pacific Telephone survey said that they
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telemarketers agree that annoying phone calls have a harmful effect on
the telemarketing industry as a whole, and industry groups strongly sup-
port regulations that prohibit such calls. 3 FTC rules controlling annoy-
ing and abusive phone calls would help to eliminate much of the public's
animosity toward the telemarketing industry. The FTC could look to
state law for guidance on rules proscribing annoying phone calls.'
Fourth, the proposed FTC rules that require delivery of goods within a
specified time and allow the consumer to cancel the order if not satis-
fied" will be conducive to halting some of the most egregious fraudu-
lent telemarketing practices. Because fraudulent telemarketing practices
often involve merchandise that is never delivered or is of inferior quali-
ty,3" these rules allow consumers to directly combat the boiler room
operators. These rules, combined with a bonding requirement, afford
consumers greater protection against fraudulent telemarketers. 4
Although the two pending bills would help to solve some of the more
insidious and troublesome problems plaguing state attempts to control
telemarketing fraud, the bills do not go far enough. There are still several
other problems that must be dealt with through federal legislation, FTC
regulation, or private action.
A. Education
Fraudulent telemarketers would certainly agree with the words of P.T.
Barnum appearing at the beginning of this Comment. In fact, many state
considered unsolicited sales calls an invasion of privacy).
343. See Ted Schwartz on Telemarketing, Quality and Service Agencies,
TELEMARKETING, March 1992, at 21, 24 ("The old adage 'one bad apple spoils the
whole bunch' can certainly be true here."); Tehrani, supra note 14, at 1 ("[Tlhe
telemarketing industry is ... concerned about the consumer's right to privacy and
we value the consumer's right to choose the type of phone call they wish or wish
not to receive.").
344. Nadel, supra note 341, at 106 (as of 1986, 45 states had laws prohibiting tele-
phone calls made with the purpose, intent, or knowledge that the call will annoy the
recipient).
345. See S. 1392, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(3)(A)-(B) (1992); H.R. 3203, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(3)(A) (1992).
346. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
347. This has been shown in the discussion of state telemarketing statutes above.
Many of the state statutes contain both a provision for a bonding requirement and
rules regarding delivery and cancellation. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-26-5(2),
13-26-39(1) (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.158.050, 19.158.120 (West Supp.
1992).
officials and private groups have directly traced much of the growth of
telemarketing directly to the ignorance of consumers.34 Since
telemarketing fraud requires the active involvement and cooperation of
the victim, state prosecutors have said that "public education is an in-
dispensable element on the war on telemarketing fraud." 9 Consumers
must learn that if a deal sounds to good to be true, it probably is. An
effective and wide-reaching effort to educate consumers nationwide
about how they can protect themselves against telemarketing scams
could "significantly reduce the numbers of victims and the dollar losses
from such schemes. " ' °
Several private groups have been very involved in the dissemination of
information about telemarketing fraud. The ATA and the DMA have both
developed brochures and pamphlets warning consumers of the danger
signs of telemarketing fraud."k VISA and MasterCard have also devel-
oped literature that they send to cardholders in their billing enve-
lopes. 2 A representative of the National Consumers League (NCL) tes-
tified before a House subcommittee that consumers are very hungry for
information.' She said that the NCL regularly warns consumers to look
for various phrases that fraudulent telemarketers often employ, such as:
"'Double your money-no risk,'... 'This is the best deal you will ever
find,'.., and 'We need your credit card numbers for identification. '"'
In addition to these private attempts at consumer education, several
federal and state agencies disseminate information to the public. The
FTC has produced over 800,000 pamphlets and brochures, recorded two
videos, and distributed billing inserts in telephone bills.' The FBI has
produced a list of "tips" to assist consumers in avoiding telemarketing
scams.' The Advisory Committee on CFTC/State Cooperation'l has
348. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 125. One state pros-
ecutor compared the fight against telemarketing fraud to the "war on drugs." He said:
Just as we learned [the] war on drugs cannot be won by enforcement
alone, we have learned [efforts to battle] telemarketing fraud must focus on
victims, as well as the criminals.
We are teaching children to say no to drugs. We must teach consumers
of all ages to hang up on boiler room operators.
Id.
349. Id. at 125.
350. Id. at 124.
351. Hearing on S. 2213, H.R. 4101, and S. 2326, supra note 15, at 90 (the ATA's
consumer guidelines "provide[] an easy to understand guide for consumers to follow
when dealing with the telemarketing call").
352. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 128.
353. Id. at 126.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 127.
356. FBI Provides Update on Telemarketing Fraud, US. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 10, 1993,
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also proposed the incorporation of investment fraud lessons into the
public school curriculum.' In 1993, the United States Postal Service
used a boiler room scam to raise awareness of telemarketing fraud
among those who had already been stung by fraudulent
telemarketers.' Postal Service officials sent out 200,000 postcards to
victims of prior scams, indicating that they had won fabulous prizes.
When the victims called the 800-number, officials lectured them on
telemarketing seams and warned them to be more cautious in the fu-
ture.'
While such programs are helpful, government agencies need more
funding to continue and expand their educational efforts. New ideas and
programs must be developed to get information to the people who need
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. The following are the FBI's tips:
1. Be skeptical of offers that sound too good to be true; they usually
are.
2. Resist high pressure sales tactics. Don't allow yourself to be hurried
into a decision.
3. Do not give your credit card number or checking account information
to anyone over the telephone unless you know with whom you are dealing.
- 4. Don't make any purchase or investment you don't fully understand.
Don't spend or invest more than you can afford.
5. Companies should be willing to provide their name, address, phone
number and references. If not, be skeptical. Verify this information before
making a purchase.
6. If you are skeptical about a company, check with the Better Business
Bureau, your State Attorney General's office, or the local consumer protection
agency before you make a purchase.
7. Report incidents of telemarketing fraud to your local Better Business
Bureau, your state, or local law enforcement authority or your nearest FBI
field office. You may also contact the National Fraud Information Center at
1-800-876-7060 for information concerning telephone frauds.
Id.
357. The Advisory Committee on CFTC/State Cooperation is a group chaired by the
CFTC Commissioner, which serves as a forum for the sharing of information between
state law enforcement officials and the CF'TC. It is comprised of four state securities
regulators, other state and federal law enforcement officials, and representatives of
the futures industry. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 96.
358. Id. at 127. This plan is based on the idea that "the earlier young people are
made aware of the dangers of investment fraud, the more unlikely the possibility that
they . .. will be victimized through fraudulent investment schemes." Id.
359. Shelby Gile, Uncle Sam Hopes "Sting" Puts Consumers on Alert, SEA1rLE
TIMES, June 13, 1993, at L2.
360. Id. Out of 200,000 postcards sent, 40,000 people responded, even though they
had previously been duped by other scams. Id.
it most. For example, inserting information about telemarketing fraud
along with social security checks"' would directly target the largest sin-
gle group of telemarketing fraud victims.' Because elderly Americans,
with fewer assets to lose, suffer disproportionately, any educational ef-
fort should focus on them.
State and federal authorities' hopes of eliminating telemarketing fraud
will not be realized until consumers disregard the slick sales pitches of
boiler room operators. Since "the best answer to [telemarketing]
scams... is an informed, skeptical public, " ' boiler rooms will contin-
ue to plague this country until consumers learn to hang up the phone.
Until that time, however, other programs can help to reduce
telemarketing fraud.
B. Registration and Bonding
State successes with registration and bonding statutes6 demonstrate
that Congress needs to enact federal registration and bonding require-
ments. Congress has previously considered such requirements' and
several state and federal agencies indicated a desire to see such require-
ments enacted.' However, although most government officials agree
that federal registration and bonding requirements would be beneficial,
such provisions have never been part of any proposed federal legislation.
At a hearing in June 1991, two House subcommittees heard testimony
on a proposal to require telemarketers to register with the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC)." 7 Under the proposed plan,
telemarketers would have to disclose all past civil lawsuits, criminal
convictions and injunctions, and post a bond before obtaining long-dis-
tance telephone service." Under the proper regulatory scheme, the
FCC could be given the authority to restrict a telemarketer's access to
long-distance service if the telemarketer engaged in fraudulent or decep-
361. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 124.
362. See Press Release: "Operation Disconnect," U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney,
Western District of New York, Mar. 4, 1993 ("The single largest category of victims
[are] the elderly.").
363. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 124.
364. See supra notes 234-66 and accompanying text.
365. TIlE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 133.
366. Id. at 133-34. The U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of California,
the Postal Inspection Service, and several state attorneys general testified before a
House subcommittee that a federal bonding and registration requirement was neces-
sary to combat telemarketing. Id.
367. See Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 208-09 (written testimony of Kenneth M.
Hearst).
368. Id. at 208-09.
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tive acts or failed to register.' By giving the FCC this authority, boiler
room operators could be thwarted because "they simply would not get
access to their primary weapon-the telephone."
37 1
In addition to keeping fraudulent telemarketers off the phone lines, the
registration requirements would aid authorities in tracking down boiler
room operators and would reduce the prevalence of recidivism among
fraudulent telemarketers. 31' Fraudulent telemarketers who register with
the FCC to gain access to long-distance service would be easily traceable
because the FCC would know exactly where the boiler room was locat-
ed. 72 If the fraudulent telemarketer attempted to move the boiler room
to another state, he would be unable to get long-distance service because
the FCC would know of the operation in the first state. 73
Bonding requirements would benefit the public because they would
limit phone-line access to fraudulent telemarketers who would be unable
or unwilling to post -bond.374 Federal proposals for bonding require-
ments have generally stated that for bonding requirements to be effec-
tive, they must be set very high.75 Because some boiler rooms can
gross several million dollars per week, a $50,000 bond requirement would
help only the first few individuals who succeed in obtaining a court judg-
ment against a fraudulent telemarketer. Therefore, a higher bond amount
would protect a greater number of consumers and would seriously im-
pede fraudulent telemarketers' access to the phones.
However, a large bond amount may limit the ability of small legitimate
telemarketers to stay in business because they would be unable to post
the necessary collateral or provide strong financial statements to the
bonding companies.370 However, this negative impact on legitimate
telemarketers can be mitigated substantially if the federal regulations su-
persede state bonding requirements. In this way, the small telemarketer
would not have to post both a state and a federal bond.
369. Id.
370. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 133.
371. Joint Hearing, supra note 46, at 208-09 (written testimony of Kenneth M.
Hearst).
372. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 134.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 134. In Arizona, state officials found that a bonding requirement chased
many boiler room operators to other states. Id. The bonding requirement would also
keep out legitimate telemarketers who do not have the assets to satisfy customer
complaints (if any arise).
375. Id. at 135.
376. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54.
C. Clearinghouse/Database
The original text of both House and Senate bills required the establish-
ment of a "clearinghouse for inquiries made to Federal agencies concern-
ing telemarketing." a" However, later drafts eliminated these provisions.
In addition, federal budgetary concerns make it unlikely that such a
clearinghouse provision will be included in any future legislation.37 A
similar proposal for a national "do-not-call" database containing the
names of consumers nationwide who wished not to be bothered by
telemarketing calls was abandoned by the FCC when it became apparent
that such a database would cost $75 million to set up and $25 million per
year to maintain.3" The FCC, therefore, acted on President Bush's wish-
es that the do-not-call proposal be implemented "at the least possible
cost to the economy."38
Although the cost of a federal clearinghouse would be high, cost alone
does not justify abandoning the proposal. In fact, a clearinghouse would
actually save state and federal government funds now expended on du-
plication of effort." Law enforcement efforts have been seriously ham-
pered by the nonexistent or inefficient sharing of information between
state and federal authorities.' A clearinghouse, with a toll-free hotline,
could provide law enforcement officials as well as consumers with "up-
to-date information on questionable products and the background of
sellers."' It would not only aid law enforcement officials in prosecut-
ing boiler room operators by giving them access to complaints from
other states and investigative materials from other enforcement agencies,
it would also serve as a "Better Business Bureau" for consumers wishing
to lodge complaints against fraudulent telemarketers.' The clearing-
house, therefore, would serve as a powerful tool for law enforcement as
well as an essential element of public education efforts.
377. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(a) (1992).
378. See Paula M. Alberta, FCC Will Let Telemarketers Regulate Themselves, But
Congressman Objects, DM NEWS, Sept. 28, 1992, at 3.
379. Id. Instead, the FCC imposed requirements that all telemarketers maintain their
own do-not-call lists. Rep. Edward J. Markey, the sponsor of the bill creating the
database, "accused the FCC of 'choosing the path of least resistance' and likened the
rules' self-regulation provisions to 'putting the fox in charge to keep the other foxes
out of the chicken coop.'" Id.
380. Id. President Bush, of course, did not take into account the enormous cost to
the economy resulting from fraudulent telemarketing.
381. See TiIE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 36 (state prose-
cutors who initiate investigations of fraudulent telemarketers currently have no way
to know whether a federal agency or another state is also investigating the
telemarketer).
382. David R. Spiegel, Foiling Phone Robbers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 14.
383. Id.
384. THE SCOURGE OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD, supra note 40, at 43.
[Vol. 21: 553, 1994] Telemarketing Fraud
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
D. FTC Guidelines
Under both pending bills, the FTC must promulgate rules defining
deceptive telemarketing. As part of the definition, the FTC must "estab-
lish criteria that are symptomatic" of deceptive telemarketing.' These
criteria are intended to give both law enforcement officials and
telemarketers a "bright line test" for determining what conduct will vio-
late the federal statute.' Thus, the FTC must ensure that the rules they
enact are sufficiently, clear to provide the necessary guidance.
Ultimately, these criteria could take the form of the FTC's recently
enacted "Guidelines for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims." 7
The FTC enacted the environmental guidelines to address the application
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act' to environmental
claims and to provide "general principles and examples of what would
and would not run afoul of these general- principals."' The guidelines
give manufacturers of "green" products definite examples of the types of
marketing claims that the FTC would consider violative of section 5."o
The guidelines, which replaced a "vague, case by case approach," allow
385. H.R. 3203, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(2)(B) (1992); S. 1392, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 3(a)(2)(B) (1992).
386. H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1992).
387. See Betty-Jane Kirwan & Leslie A. Tucker, The Practitioner: Private Certifica-
tion Provides Manufacturers One Avenue, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 16, 1992, at 7; Betty-
Jane Kirwan & Leslie A. Tucker, The Practitioner: A Few States Have Pioneered the
Environmental Trend, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 2, 1992, at 7; Betty-Jane Kirwan & Leslie A.
Tucker, The Practitioner: Federal Guidelines Provide Minimum Standard for Claims,
L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 18, 1992, at 7 [hereinafter Federal Guidelines].
388. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). Section 5 prohibits deceptive or misleading acts and
practices in or effecting commerce.
389. Kirwan & Tucker, Federal Guidelines, supra note 387, at 7. See also Washing-
ton Regulatory Reporting Associates, Owen Outlines Advertising Problem Areas, FTC
WATCH No 373, Sept. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Trade Library, FTC:Watch File.
FTC Commissioner Deborah K. Owen stated that the goal of the Guidelines was to
"describe various claims, not those which should be avoided because they are likely
to be misleading, and illustrate qualifying statements that may be added to avoid
consumer deception." Id.
390. The guidelines state that for a manufacturer to claim that a product is "recy-
clable," the manufacturer must be able to demonstrate that "the product or package
can be used as raw material in making a new product or package." Id. Further, the
guidelines state that any claim that a chemical is "friendly" to the environment is
deceptive because no chemicals are environmentally friendly. Id.
companies to conduct advertising campaigns with confidence that their
marketing claims will not violate federal law."
The FTC could use a similar framework in devising guidelines for
telemarketers. The telemarketing guidelines could give concrete ex-
amples of claims and practices that the FTC would consider deceptive.
For example, the FTC telemarketing guidelines could state that all
telemarketers operating chance promotions must fully disclose the odds
of winning each prize in the promotion either orally or in writing.' The
guidelines could state exactly the form the odds disclosure must take
and instruct telemarketers that disclosure in any other form would be
deceptive. Similar guidelines could be developed to determine the sort of
claims, for example, that telemarketers can make in investment programs
as well.
Guidelines such as these would enable telemarketers to conduct their
business with the assurance that their practices are well within federal
law.'m In addition, although the two bills are intended to supplement,
not replace, state law," the FTC guidelines might influence state offi-
cials to amend state laws so that they are in accordance with the FTC
rules. If state legislatures act to conform their law with federal law, both
law enforcement and legitimate telemarketers would benefit. Also, a
federal law would eliminate the pressure on states to enact telemarketing
laws in the vacuum created by the absence of federal legislation.
Currently, actions by telemarketers that would violate the law in some
states would be legal under the laws of other states.' If uniform laws
existed nationwide, law enforcement officials would operate under the
same definitions of deceptive telemarketing. Law enforcement officials,
therefore, would be better able to share information about violations of
the law. In addition, evidence gathered against a telemarketer in one ju-
391. Id.
392. In fact, the FTC guidelines envisioned by the two telemarketing bills are also
meant to address the application of § 5 to telemarketing. H.R. REP. No. 688, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 10-11 (1992).
393. The FrC could use state statutes as a framework for enacting these guidelines.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17511.4(1)4(B) & .5(a)(1) (West 1987).
394. Like the environmental guidelines, the FTC telemarketing guidelines would give
telemarketers "greater assurance that the claims they make will satisfy truth-in-adver-
tising laws." Kirwan & Tucker, Federal Guidelines, supra note 385, at 7.
395. See, e.g., S. 1392, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(d) (1992) ("[Nlothing in this Act
shall prevent an attorney general from exercising the powers conferred on it by the
laws of such State .... ").
396. For example, under California law, a telemarketer running a chance promotion
must disclose to the purchaser "[tihe odds ... of receiving each described item."
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17511.4(1)(4)(B) & .5(a)(1) (West 1987). Utah law does
not contain a similar provision.
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risdiction would easily apply to other areas of the country because the
laws of all states would proscribe the same activities. 7
Currently, legitimate telemarketers must contend with various statuto-
ry enactments by many states. 8 Telemarketers must remain keenly
aware of the differing statutes and regulations of the various states and
must exercise utmost care to ensure compliance with all the laws.'
One oversight by even the most careful telemarketer can result in litiga-
tion and great expense. If states had uniform laws, telemarketers would
be assured that their promotions and sales efforts were not in violation
of the law in any state.
The two federal telemarketing bills would help to reduce the growth of
fraudulent telemarketing. However, the bills do not go far enough. Only
by enacting additional legislation and funding programs aimed at reduc-
ing telemarketing fraud can the federal government hope to significantly
curb fraudulent telemarketing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Telemarketing is a dynamic, growing industry that has, over the past
decade, significantly altered the way in which products are sold. Its di-
rect, one-on-one contact with customers appeals to businesses of all
types, and most major corporations today use telemarketing in some
way. Despite its enormous growth, many experts say that telemarketing's
potential has only begun to be tapped. Unfortunately, many unscrupulous
people have also recognized the potential of telemarketing as an effective
tool to bilk consumers out of billions of dollars each year.
State and local law enforcement agencies have been the most aggres-
sive in combatting telemarketing fraud. However, due to underfunding
and limited jurisdictions, these agencies have had little effect on the
overall fraudulent telemarketing industry. The states' experiences have
demonstrated that the only effective way to combat telemarketing fraud
397. See Kirwan & Tucker, Federal Guidelines, supra note 385, at 7. The environ-
mental guidelines serve the same purpose. Federal environmental legislation helped to
eliminate the danger of conflicting state laws, which might have necessitated manu-
facturers packaging their products differently in each state. Id.
398. See supra notes 196-290 and accompanying text.
399. Interview with Alan B. Pick, supra note 54. Mr. Pick stated that much of his
time is spent staying abreast of current state telemarketing laws so that he can ad-
vise his clients on the intricacies of state law. Id.
is on a national level. Two bills introduced by the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate help to solve some of the problems faced by state
and local agencies, but they do not go far enough in combatting fraud.
In addition to the solutions offered in the two bills, Congress needs to
enact a federal registration and bonding requirement, allocate funds to
education on telemarketing fraud, and establish a central clearinghouse
to gather information on fraudulent telemarketers. In addition, the FTC
needs to enact guidelines to clarify for legitimate telemarketers as well
as law enforcement officials what sort of activities would be considered
deceptive. Only through a single, coordinated effort between federal,
state, and local government can this problem be brought under control.
Anything less will prove ineffective and could exacerbate the problem.
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